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Abstract
Plaban Das
RISK ANALYSIS OF AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE AND ITS SAFETY IMPACT ON
MIXED TRAFFIC STREAM
2017-2018
Dr. Parth Bhavsar
Master of Science in Civil Engineering

In 2016, more than 35,000 people died in traffic crashes, and human error was the
reason for 94% of these deaths. Researchers and automobile companies are testing
autonomous vehicles in mixed traffic streams to eliminate human error by removing the
human driver behind the steering wheel. However, recent autonomous vehicle crashes
while testing indicate the necessity for a more thorough risk analysis. The objectives of
this study were (1) to perform a risk analysis of autonomous vehicles and (2) to evaluate
the safety impact of these vehicles in a mixed traffic stream. The overall research was
divided into two phases: (1) risk analysis and (2) simulation of autonomous vehicles.
Risk analysis of autonomous vehicles was conducted using the fault tree method. Based
on failure probabilities of system components, two fault tree models were developed and
combined to predict overall system reliability. It was found that an autonomous vehicle
system could fail 158 times per one-million miles of travel due to either malfunction in
vehicular components or disruption from infrastructure components. The second phase of
this research was the simulation of an autonomous vehicle, where change in crash
frequency after autonomous vehicle deployment in a mixed traffic stream was assessed. It
was found that average travel time could be reduced by about 50%, and 74% of conflicts,
i.e., traffic crashes, could be avoided by replacing 90% of the human drivers with
autonomous vehicles.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The transportation system, the key to sociological and economic progress, has
ebbed and flowed throughout the history of mankind to reduce travel time and increase
comfortability. After many trials and tribulations, we can now move ourselves and
transfer goods from one place to another, nearby or distant, by selecting one or multiple
transportation mode alternatives. Whether the mode is a personal vehicle or airplane, the
design features are based on customer/user preferences and perspectives. The evolution
of the transportation system has undergone many modifications, while many modes have
become extinct. In the stone age of antiquity, humans walked and ran upon the solid earth
with bare feet (Demartini, 2014). Afterwards they tamed horses and horses became the
primary mode of transportation for many years. Even though horse-drawn vehicles were
carrying 120,000 passengers per day in New York by the late 1860s; yet, they were
unwelcome as they were driven at very slow speeds and had unpleasant byproducts
(McShane & Tarr, 2007; Tarr., 1996). Moreover, 200 people were killed in New York by
horses and horse-drawn vehicles in 1900 (McShane, 1995). However, transportation
systems modernized after the industrial revolution. The innovation of steam engines in
the late 18th century was the first major advancement for transportation. In 1801, the first
steam engine automobile was exhibited in England. These first-generation automobiles
were inefficient and had the same speed as horses. The automobile engine went through
many further modifications over the next hundred years (Lab). Later, the combustion
engine was invented, and automobiles became more efficient with faster speed.
Moreover, personal transportation became more affordable day by day due to advances in
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technologies. However, the overall transportation system has been overloaded due to the
increased number of vehicles. According to a recent report card by the American Society
of Civil Engineers (ASCE) (NHTSA, 2015), in 2014 traffic congestion cost $160 billion
in wasted time and fuel in the United States (U.S.) which averaged out to 42 hours per
driver annually. More than 2 out of 5 miles of urban interstates are congested with high
volume of traffic (NHTSA, 2015). It is not just valuable revenues and resources that are
being wasted due the traffic congestion. Unfortunately, these congested conditions
provoke road rage and risky driving behaviors (Salomon & Mokhtarian, 1997). Risky
driving behavior leads to traffic crashes and results in morbidity (number of drivers with
injuries that eventually lead to death) and mortality (actual accident death count). More
lives have been lost in traffic crashes than from human diseases for last many years
(Petridou & Moustaki, 2000). According to NHTSA traffic safety fact sheets, traffic
crashes were responsible for more than 35,000 deaths on U.S. roadways (NHTSA,
2016a), and 10 out of the total 100 deaths caused by distracted driving (NHTSA, 2016d).
It is important to include that human behavioral factors were responsible for 94% of total
road crashes (Petridou & Moustaki, 2000). The traffic crash fatality trend in the U.S. per
year from 2005 is presented in Figure 1 (NHTSA, 2016b). However, researchers have
always predicted that educated and skilled drivers with advanced driver training are less
prone to be involved in risky driving; hence, driver training results less traffic crashes
(Roenker, Cissell, Ball, Wadley, & Edwards, 2003). Recent studies show that skilled
drivers overestimate their capabilities and lean toward indecent driving behavior and
habitual over speeding (Allan F. Williams & O'Neill, 1974). Nonetheless, many active
safety features, i.e., automatic braking, lane departure warning and parking assistance,
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have been installed in vehicles to assist human drivers and reduce human error-related
traffic crashes. Since these safety features have been improved, drivers are assured of
safe driving conditions and an ensured safe ride. Now researchers and automobile
companies are progressing ahead to eliminate human drivers behind the vehicle wheels
and bring computerization and automation into the overall transportation system
(Antsaklis, Passino, & Wang, 1991).

Fatalities per Year in USA
50,000
45,000
40,000
Total Fatalities

35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fatalities 43,51 42,70 41,25 37,42 33,88 32,99 32,47 33,78 32,89 32,74 35,09 37,46

Figure 1. Traffic fatalities per year in the United States

The autonomous vehicle is a global phenomenon, which continues to attract the
attention of researchers, the automotive industry, transportation professionals and
policymakers worldwide. This vehicle has the potential to become a safe, sustainable,
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ecofriendly and personal mode of transportation. An autonomous vehicle can navigate
itself on the roads and highways as well as in complex urban traffic scenarios—all
without human intervention. The autonomous navigation can avert the crashes currently
caused by human error. Fagnant and Kockelman predicted that autonomous vehicles can
save more than 21,000 lives per year and eradicate more than four million crashes with a
market penetration of 90% (Daniel J. Fagnant & Kara Kockelman, 2015). Furthermore,
these advanced vehicles can provide mobility to new road user groups, i.e., children, the
elderly and disabled, increase the transportation infrastructure capacity, save fuel and
emit fewer pollutants. Autonomous vehicles could drastically change current land use
practices by promoting more ride sharing, and reducing the need for parking spots.
Vehicle windshields could be used as advertisement billboards! However, researchers
predict that the consumers will initially consider these vehicles unsafe and will not spend
money to purchase those (D. J. Fagnant & K. Kockelman, 2015). Meanwhile, the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) AgeLab and the New England Motor Press
Association (NEMPA) conducted a survey among nearly 3000 volunteers to explore
people’s perspectives regarding autonomous vehicles and found that 48% of the
participants would never choose the autonomous technology, while 29% do not trust
these vehicles to any extent (Abraham et al., 2017). As a result, it is important to conduct
a detailed analysis regarding the performance of autonomous vehicles to dispel people’s
misconceptions concerning these vehicles, and to overcome this big stumbling block on
the path of implementing these vehicles.
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Background and Motivation
The autonomous vehicle has been ameliorating human lives since 1935—in the
pages of science fiction books. The concept of road automation was introduced at the
New York World’s Fair in 1939 (Geddes & Bel, 1940). The first national automated
driving program was started under the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act
(ISTEA), signed into law in 1991. Later, the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency’s (DARPA’s) Grand Challenge was launched in 2005 to motivate the
development of algorithms and technologies to develop the first autonomous vehicle that
could navigate successfully a route of 132 miles without any driver intervention (Buehler,
Iagnemma, & Eds, 2005). The hope was that the autonomous vehicle would be able to
replace human drivers in dangerous situations and promised that in the future this vehicle
would catalyze a revolutionary advancement in road and highway safety. Since then,
many automotive and technology companies have raced to be the first to sell safe
autonomous vehicles to consumers. However, these vehicles are equipped with highly
tuned sensors and actuators, which are responsible for their autonomous navigation.
Despite the many benefits of autonomous vehicles, these advanced components created a
new set of challenges. Hence, it is necessary to evaluate these technologies before
implementation and to identify strategies to integrate autonomous vehicles into current
streams of traffic.
Several states in the U.S. have started to sign new laws and regulations to promote
the testing and development of autonomous vehicles. Nevada was the first state to pass
legislation on autonomous vehicle testing on state roadways in June 2011. California was
the second state with their legislation signed in September 2012 (Nowakowski,
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Shladover, Chan, & Tan, 2015). California laws and regulations are applicable for a
Level 3 automation system (conditional automation) and higher levels. Automation
leveling is based on the definition of the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE).
However, it was mandated that for testing on state roads and highways, each vehicle
needs to be equipped with an independent event data recorder (EDR) to record all sensor
data that can be gathered at least 30 seconds before a collision happens and to store that
data at least for 3 years. Furthermore, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), who
currently hold a permit to test their vehicles on state highways and freeways, must
publicly share their test results (reports of incidents, i.e., crashes and disengagement of
technology) with the California Department of Motor Vehicles (CA DMV). According to
disengagement reports submitted to the CA DMV, various non-autonomous vehicles
driven by human drivers were the primary cause for a significant number of incidents
(Delphi, 2016; Google, 2016; Mercedes-Benz, 2016; Nissan, 2016; Volkswagen, 2016).
Table 1 presents a summary of crashes from recent reports. These reports also include
disengagement incidents in which the operator disengages autonomous driving and
controls the vehicle manually. About 2,700 disengagements were reported because of
unexpected autonomous driving situations such as potholes, poor lane markings,
construction zones, and adverse road weather conditions (Fingas, 9 May 2015;
Sorokanich, 30 August 2014; Vincent, 13 January 2016). In addition, various hardware
and software systems responsible for autonomous driving are prone to disruptions and/or
hacking. Researchers recently developed a system consisting of low-power lasers and a
pulse generator that can mislead autonomous vehicle sensors, such as LIDAR into seeing
objects where none exist (Harris, 4 Sep 2015). Researchers also demonstrated that
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hackers could remotely take over the control of autonomous vehicle brakes, accelerators,
and other critical safety components (Simonite, 2016). Other researchers recently found
an algorithm for autonomous vehicles, which was used to detect objects and was subject
to error when traffic signs were camouflaged with stickers, graffiti or art (Evtimov et al.,
2017). The researchers examined the algorithm by putting stickers on stop signs and
observed that the vehicle misread the sign as a “45 mile per hour” speed limit sign.
Moreover, a fatal crash occurred on a state highway in Florida on May 7, 2016 due to
vehicular sensors failing to detect a white tractor-trailer while driving in autopilot mode.
This report was issued in a preliminary investigations (Klein, 2016). However, the
manufacturing company claimed that the vehicular system was designed to assist the
driver and that it should not have been left unattended.

Table 1
California DMV autonomous vehicle crash report

Automobile
Company
Year
GM
Cruise,
LLC
May 2017

Google
LLC
GM
LLC

Autonomous
Vehicle
Information
Moving

Auto, March 2017

Moving

Cruise, March 2017

Stopped
traffic

March 2017
GM
LLC

Cruise,

Moving
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Other Party Information
Bicyclist
rear
ended
the
autonomous vehicle
Non-autonomous vehicle rearended autonomous vehicle while
inching forward with traffic at red
light
Non-autonomous vehicle clipped
in front of autonomous vehicle while
turning
Non-autonomous vehicle rearended after traffic light turned
green

Table 1 (continued)

Automobile
Company

Year
Dec. 2016

Google
LLC

Auto,

Google
LLC

Auto, Oct. 2016

Autonomous
Vehicle
Information

Moving
Moving

Sept. 2016
Google
LLC

Auto,

Moving

Google
LLC

Auto,
Sept. 2016

Stopped
traffic

Google
LLC

Auto,
Aug. 2016

Stopped at
stop sign

Nissan
North
America, Inc.
May 2016

Moving

Other Party Information
Non-autonomous vehicle collided
into autonomous vehicle side doors
while making left turn
Non-autonomous
vehicle rearended autonomous vehicle at a
yield sign
Non-autonomous driver violated
red light and collided with right
side of autonomous vehicle
Non-autonomous vehicle rearin ended autonomous vehicle while it
was yielding to oncoming vehicles
Non-autonomous vehicle rearended autonomous vehicle while it
was stopped at stop sign. Driver
left the scene of the crash (hit and
run).
Non-autonomous vehicle suddenly
stopped in front of autonomous
vehicle
causing
autonomous
vehicle to rear-end leading vehicle

Potential risks during the transition phase (i.e., from conventional vehicles to
100% autonomous vehicles in the transportation system), as well as the vulnerability of
other vehicular and communication technologies, could disrupt the mass deployment of
autonomous vehicles on our roads. However, it is essential to conduct a thorough risk
analysis of autonomous vehicles. Since the autonomous vehicle is equipped with
hundreds of sensors, actuators, and communication devices to navigate autonomously,
the reliability of these sensors must be evaluated before mass deployment. Severe traffic
crashes may cause and result in fatalities and property losses if the advanced autonomous
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vehicle navigation sensors are not fully developed. This risk analysis needs to be
designed to explore the root causes of potential failures of autonomous vehicles and
identify the chain of events that could lead to the failure of system integrity. The
comprehensive risk analysis results are needed to guide policymakers to support the
deployment of these advanced vehicles into the large US transportation grid.
Research Objectives
As technology evolves, and continues to evolve each day, the apparent risks
associated with these new technologies begin to multiply making the risk analysis process
more important than ever. Risk analysis is utilized to identify the potential hazardous
sources and accident scenarios and to assess the potential impact these can have on
human, environmental, and technological targets. It could become a valuable tool to help
risk managers reduce potential threats and policymakers to develop a management and
maintenances framework, which a manufacture must follow to ensure public safety. In
this thesis research, a comprehensive risk analysis was conducted to identify the threats
associated with autonomous vehicles. Risk analysis is a potential source of novel
database information; furthermore, it can guide both professionals and policymakers in
their acceptance and regulation of the policies and regulations needed for autonomous
vehicle mass deployment. A probabilistic fault-tree analysis tool is used to identify
potential risks. Furthermore, it is also necessary to identify strategies to integrate
autonomous vehicles into current streams of traffic, as the number of autonomous
vehicles will be low at the initial phase. So, this research focuses on the transition phase
in which autonomous vehicles will become a part of the current traffic mix of
conventional vehicles.
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The objectives of autonomous vehicle risk analysis are to:
1) Develop the hierarchical sequence of events that may result in the failure of an
autonomous vehicle or the infrastructure it depends on, in the form of a fault tree,
2) identify shortest routes (i.e., minimal cut sets of the developed fault trees) leading
to overall autonomous vehicle system failures and prioritize them based on the
failure probabilities of basic event occurrences, and
3) simulate a microscopic traffic model and investigate the impact of autonomous
vehicle failures on the efficiency of overall transportation infrastructures.
Notably, an autonomous vehicle is represented as equipped with Level 4 and Level 5
automation systems as defined by the SAE (high and full automation). Furthermore, only
an autonomous passenger car or a similar vehicle is considered here. Transit trucks or
other types of on- or off-the-road vehicles are not included.
Organization of Thesis
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter introduces the
research, background and motivation behind the research. The objectives of the research
are also briefly discussed in this chapter. A thorough literature review on autonomous
vehicle systems, risk analysis and its applications, as well as fault tree methods are
presented in the second chapter. The detailed methodology is described in the third
chapter. The fourth chapter explores the three phases of autonomous vehicle risk analysis
to evaluate the reliability of the integration of an automated navigation system. The three
phases are: risk identification, risk estimation and risk hierarchization. Then, the results
of fault tree analysis are compared and validated with real-world data collected from the
California Department of Motor Vehicles (CA DMV). The fifth chapter presents the
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Delphi survey structure and the results of the survey. A statistical method called
Kendall’s coefficient of concordance W is used to analyze survey results. The algorithm
of autonomous vehicle navigation is presented in chapter six. A traffic network is
simulated using a microscopic traffic simulation platform and then calibrated. This
simulation model is evaluated with different autonomous vehicle market penetration
levels. Finally, concluding remarks along with recommendations and future directions are
presented in chapter seven. All the codes to run autonomous vehicle simulation on a
microscopic traffic simulation platform are provided in the appendices.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
Autonomous vehicles have the potential to eliminate traffic accidents due to human
error thereby providing a safe and sustainable transportation system. However, a fully
developed autonomous vehicle has not become a reality yet. Even a small misjudgment in
autonomous navigation could lead to highly devastating crashes, which could result in
both fatalities and property loss. So, a comprehensive risk analysis of autonomous
vehicles is required before their mass deployment on roads and highways. Several
researchers have developed a preliminary risk analysis model of autonomous vehicles.
Different autonomous vehicle sub-systems and/ or a few transportation infrastructure
components were considered in those studies; however, weather, other road users (nonautonomous drivers, cyclists, pedestrians, etc.) and road surface conditions were not
included. As far as the author knows, the fault-tree based risk analysis of autonomous
vehicles in mixed traffic streams considering both vehicular components and
infrastructure components has not been conducted yet. This chapter is organized as
follows:
 Autonomous Vehicles: This section summarizes the overall system integration of
vehicular components used for autonomous navigation. The summary of vehicular
components will help identify the potential risks of autonomous vehicles.
 Risk Analysis: This section reviews the risk analysis phases, along with analysis
elements. Later on, the risk analysis techniques will be classified into two classes.
Fault tree method, one of the risk analysis methods, is also explained briefly in this
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section, as the author will use this technique to estimate the overall failure rate of
autonomous vehicles.
 Risk Analysis of Autonomous Vehicles: Finally, the proposed risk analysis methods
in different studies will be summarized. These methods will be divided into three
separate classes based on their study structures.
Autonomous Vehicle
The concept of an intelligent transportation system has been a subliminal
possibility for many futurists since the 1930s. However, the subliminal is finally
becoming a reality as Japan, U.S. and Europe focus on large-scale integration and
deployment of their individual ITS programs. Connected vehicles, equipped with
communication devices and within a connected infrastructure environment, could collect
previously unobtainable traffic data and can also share that information with other
connected vehicles and monitoring units simultaneously. This communication between
vehicles and infrastructure has received a great deal of attention since the 1960s.
Transportation officials and engineers have encouraged designers to create higher levels
of safety and mobility improvements on the roadways for more than 50 years. The
connected infrastructure communication with autonomous vehicles and technologies like
global positioning systems (GPSs), drones, and other monitoring devices seem to have
unlimited expected benefits. One benefit could come from the implementation of fully
autonomous vehicles with the ability to perceive its environment, make route selections,
and drive by itself without any human involvement or any occupants at all (Richard
Wallace & Silberg, August 2012).
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Figure 2. Infographic architecture of autonomous vehicle functional components

The exponential growth of processor speeds within the last 30 years and the
availability of feasible technologies have enabled transportation engineers to focus on
vision-based vehicles detection for driver assistance over last decade. Figure 2 shows
different functional components of autonomous vehicles along with their specific tasks.
Planning generates potential trajectories for an autonomous vehicle, based on the origin
and destination chosen by the passengers. Driver behaviors will be considered while
selecting routes on previously loaded maps. Position recognition or sensing detects the
surrounding objects, other road users, transportation infrastructure components, and also
estimates current positions, attitude, velocity and acceleration. Then, vehicles will
optimize and establish safe paths along with other objects to complete a safe trip. Finally,
the vehicular control will perform a control movement and the vehicle will be driven to
the next position on its trajectories.
Radar-based (S. Park, T. Kim, S. Kang, & Heon, 2003), laser-based (Chieh-Chih,
Thorpe, & Suppe, 2003), (John Hancock et al., 1997) and acoustic-based (Chellappa,
Gang, & Qinfen, 2004) approaches are being used for vehicle detection, where the system
doesn’t require powerful computing algorithms and processing units. A camera-based
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vision system, which requires fast processing speed and high-capacity data storage, can
represent a nearly 360 ° field of view. This allows a greater handling efficiency when
entering a curves, overtaking other vehicles, and early recognition of traffic signals and
signs as well as dedicated lanes and bikes or pedestrians (Sun, Bebis, & Miller, 2006).
Level of automation. Based on the level of vehicle versus human control, the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has specified five levels of
automation (Blanco et al., 2015). The goal of these classifications is to provide a common
terminology for automated driving. However, SAE International also developed another
harmonized classification system for the same purpose. As the level of automation
increases, the responsibility of the nonautonomous driver shifts from driving to
supervisory tasks. A brief description of the NHTSA autonomous vehicle classifications
is given below.
Level 0 (no automation). Over the duration of the journey, the non-autonomous
driver solely controls the vehicle (brake, steering, throttle, and motive power), and he or
she is responsible for the safe operation of the vehicle. A vehicle may have certain level
of driver assistance and support systems (for example: lane departure warning, blind spot
warning, etc.). These support systems can provide warnings as well as automated
secondary control, like wipers, headlights, hazard lights, etc., but they do not have control
over steering, braking, or throttle.
Level 1 (function specific automation). At this level, one or more control specific
control functions are integrated into the vehicle system, although the driver controls the
overall navigations and motions. The vehicle can cede the authority of the driver and add
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certain levels of control in crash-imminent situations, for example dynamic brake support
in emergencies.
Level 2 (combined function automation). Automation of at least two primary
control functions is involved in this level to release the driver’s responsibilities over the
control of those functions. However, the driver is still expected to take over responsibility
if those assigned controls are perceived to compromise the vehicle’s safe operation due to
unexpected problems on the roadways.
Level 3 (limited self-driving automation). The driver is relieved from the control
of all safety critical functions, although he or she is expected to take over the control
occasionally, but within a sufficiently comfortable transition time.
Level 4 (full self-driving automation). The vehicle can navigate, perform all
driving control functions, and monitor the roadway for an entire trip without any
intervention of the human driver.
On the other hand, there are six levels of automation from “No Automation” to
“Full Automation” identified in SAE classification. The comparison between NHTSA
and SAE International classifications is shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Comparison between NHTSA and SAE International levels of automation
classification

It should be noted that this study considers only the Level 4 passenger car for
analysis, and this does not include transit or other type of on- or off-the-road vehicles, i.e.
trucks, buses, farm vehicles.
System disintegration. To identify the potential risks related to a system, the first
step is to divide the whole system into basic components. The analysis of technological
developments installed in autonomous vehicles could be a way to figure out the sensitive
components of these vehicles, which would eventually lead to risk identification. The
automotive features which made autonomous vehicles safer than the conventional
vehicles are discussed here.
Intelligent adaptive cruise control system. Even though road accidents still occur
every day with major economic losses to the society, but statistic shows that numbers of
fatalities in road accidents are decreasing. There were 1.11 fatalities per 100 million
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vehicle miles traveled (VMT) in 2010. This number was 1.53 in 2000 (Congress, 2013).
Rear-end collisions were responsible for approximately 1.8 million crashes, which
resulted in 1,570 fatalities in 1998 (Persson, Botling, Hesslow, & Johansson, 1999).
Moreover, maximum use of highway capacity would be achievable if vehicles could run
closely without causing crashes at the posted highway speed (Swaroop & Huandra, 1998;
Swaropp & Rajagopal, 1999). But this constant spacing platoon could only stabilize if
vehicles are equipped with an adaptive cruise control system (ACC). This system
automatically controls the throttle and/or the brake to adjust the vehicle velocity and
maintain a predetermined safe distance from the following vehicle. On-board installed
sensors, like RADAR and LIDAR, etc., measure the distances between two successive
vehicles.
A maximum traffic flow of more than 4200 vehicles/hour per each lane when all
vehicles are equipped with this driving assistance system could be achievable
(VanderWerf, Shladover, Miller, & Kourjanskaia, January 2002), while manual driving
permits around 2000 vehicles/hour (P. Ryus, L. Elefteriadou, R. G. Dowling, & Ostrom,
2011). To evaluate the probability of collision between vehicles, researchers used Monte
Carlo simulations and found that ACC significantly reduces collision probability
(Touran, Brackstone, & McDonald, May 1999).
Some automaker companies introduced ACC in their cars at the beginning of the
21st century. Researchers found that 1.1 to 10.7% fuel consumption could be reduced by
using this driver assistant. Moreover, implementation of safer roadways would be
applicable through adopting this system (D. Godbole, R. Sengupta, J. Misener, N.
Kourjanskaia, & J.B. Michael, January 1998; W.G. Najm & A.L. Burgett, 1997). A 60%
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reduction in air pollution from transportation sectors would be possible if 10 percent of
vehicles were equipped with the ACC (Bose & Ioannou, 2001). It requires no road
infrastructure modification to work effectively, so this driver assistant system is available
for immediate use (T. Chira-Chavala & S.M. Yoo, 1994). Researchers implemented
human following behavior based on fuzzy logic or neuro-controllers to train ACC
spacing adjustments (Germann & Isermann, 1995). However, nonlinear mathematical
control models like sliding mode control (Gerdes & Hedrick, 1997) and optimal dynamic
back-stepping control (X. Lu, Shladover, & Hedrick, June 2001) have been used in
deriving the desired acceleration for the string stability of the expected vehicle platoon.
Automotive collision avoidance/ warning system. Loss of control causes at least
9 percent of all car crashes in the U.S. every year ("National Motor Vehicle Crash
Causation Survey," July 2008). Statistics shows that the drivers’ delay in recognizing or
judging a “dangerous” situation is responsible for a large number of road accidents.
When it is possible to overcome human driver limitations by automating some parts of
driving tasks, this type of accident could be eliminated. Researchers have developed one
driving assistance system, called the collision avoidance system which requires a
RADAR sensor installed at the front of the vehicle. This sensory system could perceive a
dangerous situation based on the collection of robust and reliable data, which can be
utilized to estimate the time of collision (TTC). If the time to collision at a current speed
is lower than the threshold value, then the system automatically controls the car to brake
and/or steer from an imminent collision. It was found that more than 50% of rear end
collisions could be avoided though collision avoidance system ("Report to Congress on
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ITS Program," January 1997) and
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90% of accidents could be prevented with one second of warning time provided to a
driver (Woll, 1997).
The collision avoidance system first warns the driver when the distance between
successive vehicles becomes smaller than the warning distance, and in the more critical
situation it brakes automatically when this distance drops to less than the braking
distance. Honda and Mazda presented a model to determine and scale the warning and
braking distance according to drivers’ preferences based on different environments
(Seiler, Song, & Hedrick, 1998). Later a model was developed to calculate the brake
timing for rear end collision warnings (B. Wilson, 2001). Other researchers also
eventually developed another nonlinear model, which could derive road tire friction
(Kyongsu & Jintai, 2001; Yi, Woo, Kim, & Lee, March 1999). This model was further
updated to calculate tire road friction and scale critical distances (Seiler et al., 1998).
Researchers also proposed and designed a neural network to estimate the collision
avoided path (Eskandarian & Thiriez, September 1998).
Lane departure warning. A considerable portion of road accidents are caused by
a temporary and involuntary fading of a driver’s vision, which can be caused by sleep
deprivation, fatigue, using mobile phone, chatting, or some other diversion, which leads
the vehicle to leave its designated lane. In the U.S., about 11% of vehicles that fail to stay
in the proper lane cause vehicle crashes ("National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation
Survey," July 2008). A machine vision system, called the lane departure warning system,
could improve road safety by preventing a vehicle’s unintentional deviation from the
center of its traveling lane. Different sensors have been researched to perform lane
departure warning, including but not limited to LIDAR, camera, and GPS devices. In
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case of camera vision-based system, a camera (or multiple cameras) installed on-board
visualize the solid and striped markings of the road ahead and then the steering is
adjusted to keep the vehicle in the center of the lane.
Researchers used a temporal filter for noise reduction and road marking detecting
to diagnose road edges (Beucher & Bilodeau, 1994; Yu, Beucher, & Bilodeau, 1992).
Although the detected road edges are typically irregular and rough, this model still
requires relatively high computational costs. Another method of lane detection depends
on the top view images captured by camera vision, which are compared with the world
coordinate of lane edges based on online computation (Bertozzi & Broggi, 1998;
Pomerleau, 1995). Deformable mathematical road models are suggested to detach road
boundaries based on a linear model which could not provide enough accurate results.
Splines or a parabolic model are options, but these models are sensitive to noises
(Enkelmann, Struck, & Geisler, 1995; Risack, Mohler, & Enkelmann, 2000). Later
researchers developed a model based on particle filtering and multiple cues to be efficient
under a variety of conditions like shadows, cloudy days, and rain, but the model could
also be applicable to the curved sections of the roadway (Apostoloff & Zelinsky, 2003).
An edge distribution function (EDF) was proposed by (J. Lee, 2002) and later modified
by (Fardi, Scheunert, Cramer, & Wanielik, 2003) through a boundary pixel extractor to
detect curved roads with dashed lane markings. Recently a linear-parabolic lane boundary
model was proposed where a linear model was designed to fit the adjacent straight
section, and a quadratic function was used to detect incoming curves, even in the
presence of shadows and different lighting conditions (Jung & Kelber, 2004).
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Intersection collision avoidance system. Recent studies show that 36% of all road
accidents in the U.S. occur due to intersection collisions ("National Motor Vehicle Crash
Causation Survey," July 2008). In 2004, signal and stop sign intersection crashes are
responsible for $7.9 billion in economic losses (W.G. Najm, J.D. Smith, & M.
Yanagisawa, 2007). To avoid this type of collision, an intersection collision avoidance
system was designed and developed for predicting driver behaviors at stop sign- and
signal-controlled intersections. This new system enables a vehicle to handle emergency
intersection problems safely. The vision-based system estimates the time to collision
(TTC) in any type of traffic rule violation and controls the speed and acceleration in real
time to avoid crashes. However, the DSRC (dedicated short-range communication)
system could be used to allocate transmission windows to vehicles approaching an
intersection, which starts with generating a poll request to inquire about their maneuver
status; then, sends safety messages to ensure safe intersection movements (Rawashdeh &
Mahmud, 2008). Inter-vehicular communication leads to a more flexible method for this
information communication where all vehicles entering the intersection broadcast their
locations with direction, speed and destination (Dogan et al., 2004). Later real time
infrastructure communication using telematics and wireless sensor network is proposed to
supply base stations with the necessary information for collision prediction and
avoidance options (Basma, Tachwali, & Refai, 2011). Magnetic sensors (Kyungbok, Jae
Jun, & Dohyun, 2007), the camera vision method (Atev, Masoud, Janardan, &
Papanikolopoulos, 2005), radar (Menon, Gorjestani, Shankwitz, & Donath, 2004) and a
combination of loop detector and radar systems (Ashkan Sharafsaleh & Chan, November
6-10, 2005) are used as wireless sensors in different research methodologies.
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Electronic stability control. Electronic stability control (ESC) systems are another
breakthrough driving assistant technology used to monitor the speed of each wheel, the
steering wheel angle, yaw rate and lateral acceleration comprising sensors, brakes, the
engine control module and a microcomputer. This on-board car safety system is designed
to enhance safe driving through improving vehicles’ lateral stability and assisting drivers
in critical situations or under unfavorable conditions (rain, snow, etc.). When sensor data
detect an emergency, the ESC system applies the brakes to individual wheels and
possibly reduces the engine torque so as not to lose the control of the vehicles. This
system could reduce the number of accidents due to driver error and loss of control. 22
percent of road accidents, which are caused due to running off the edge of the road or a
loss of control, could be avoided by ESC ("National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation
Survey," July 2008). A Swedish research team showed that ESC could reduce from 20%
to 40% of crashes on wet surfaces or surfaces covered by snow or ice (Tingvall, Krafft,
Kullgren, & Lie, May 19-22, 2003).
Earlier ESC was treated as an optional driving assistance system on EuropeanU.S. luxury cars. In 1995 the ESC system was first introduced in Europe and later
appeared in the U.S. market (Memmer, 2001). Later Audi, Ford, General Motors, Toyota,
BMW and Mercedes incorporated this technology into their cars. This system includes
sensor offset compensation, sensor signal filtering and processing, sensor plausibility,
active wheel lift detection and software enhancement of brake hydraulics to achieve
vehicle stability control (Eric Fenaux & Jeremy Buisson, 2007).
A simple model called the β-method was developed to calculate the sideslip angle
during traffic maneuvers (Shibahata, Shimada, & Tomari, 1993). By regulating the
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engine’s torque and wheel brake pressure using traction control components another
system was used to minimize the error and help the driver to keep the car under control
(van Zanten, Erhardt, & Pfaff, 1995). An on-line sensor monitoring method using sensors
in the ESC system was developed, implemented and produced in large volumes (Fennel
& Ding, 2000). Later a dynamic model was built and verified using MATLAB and
Simulink (Wang & Xue, 2004). A combination of anti-braking and a traction control
system was used to derive another dynamic model with control logic for active yaw
control (Y. Jia, J. Song, & Sun, 2004). The developed fuzzy logic PID controller is
embedded in the modern ESC system to achieve more reliability (Liangmo Wang, Li
Tan, Li-hua An, Zhi-lin Wu, & Li, 2012).
Pedestrian detection system. Pedestrian detection is a challenging problem in a
vision-based intelligent transportation system using cameras and RADARs installed on
fast moving vehicles. Normally, a candidate selection mechanism is used to solve this
pedestrian recognition problem in vision based system, which is done by performing
object segmentation on either a 3-D scene or 2-D image plane, (Alonso et al., 2007).
However, to ensure a low false negative ratio, this system requires yielding lots of
candidate per frame and assumes a flat terrain, which causes loss of depth of scene. This
system could be successful with less computational cost. A stereo vision system can
overcome these problems, but the solution would entail high computational cost and a
dynamic calibration model. Infrared images (Fardi, Schuenert, & Wanielik, 2005;
Fengliang & Fujimura, 2002) and infrared stereo (Bertozzi, Broggi, Lasagni, & Rose,
2005) have also been applied in different research efforts to provide better visibility at
night and during adverse weather conditions.
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Researchers mostly use shape analysis to detect pedestrians in real traffic
scenarios. Also some other techniques like vertical linear feature with human template
(Bertozzi et al., 2003), hierarchical shape templates on Chamfer distance (Gavrila,
Giebel, & Munder, 2004), Haar wavelet representation (Mohan, Papageorgiou, & Poggio,
2001), probabilistic human template (Nanda & Davis, 2002), sparse Gabor filters and
support vector machines (Hong, Nanning, & Junjie, 2005), graph kernels (Suard, Guigue,
Rakotomamonjy, & Benshrair, 2005), and motion analysis (Franke & Heinrich, 2002)
have been considered for pedestrian detection in different research papers. The fast and
robust algorithm of neural networks has been successfully applied to detect pedestrians
and roads in cluttered scenes using a pair of moving cameras (Liang & Thorpe, 1999;
Szarvas, Yoshizawa, Yamamoto, & Ogata, 2005).
Vehicular sensors for automation. In the previous section, automotive features
are used to track down the necessary sensors and components of autonomous vehicles.
These sensors have to work smoothly to maintain the autonomous movements of these
vehicles; consequently, the failure of one sensor could lead to the failure of the whole
system unless there is a backup plan to recover the defective components immediately
and automatically. The analysis of the potential risks for each sensor and its reliability as
part of the whole system are required to ensure safe transportation systems. To identify
these preliminary risks, a fault tree for autonomous vehicles was developed and analyzed
to determine system availability or reliability rate (Duran, Robinson, Kornecki, &
Zalewski, 2013a). The functional details of these sensors are presented here for further
analysis.
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LIDAR. LIDAR (light detection and ranging) is a remote sensing technology. Its
uses are amazingly varied especially since its primary objective is to collect 3D
information and to use light in the form of a pulsed laser to measure different distances
from its airborne location to earth. LIDAR’s role in the autonomous vehicle operation is
to collect kinematic information about the vehicle and physical information about its
surroundings, The LIDAR optical sensor is installed on the hood of autonomous car. It
includes a laser, lens filter, receiver, power regulator, rotating mirror, and onboard
processor. The autonomous car LIDAR system is a combination of synchronizing
hardware, which includes precision motors and position encoders, as well as an onboard
processing unit that detects the objects and produces both 2D and 3D point clouds. The
processing unit must be placed at a high clearance location from the ground; moreover,
protective measures are needed to protect the unit from foreign object impact, shock or
vibration resulting from crashes or rough terrain navigation, which could lead to failure
of the system.
High resolution 3D LIDAR could be useful for up to a 50-meter range with
efficient operation in the shadows and different lighting conditions (Fishman, 1996). A
complex model of roads (Box & Wilson, 1954), precise localization system using GPS
and/or an internal measurement unit (IMU) (Au & L.Beck, 2001; Bucher & Bourgund,
1990) are synchronized with the LIDAR system in many research projects for
autonomous driving systems. Other researchers combined LIDAR and computer based
vision technology for this purpose (Gavrila, 2001).
RADAR sensor technology. Radio waves are transmitted into the environment to
scatter back information on obstacles around the vehicle and increases awareness of other
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vehicles ahead and behind. This sensor keeps a digital eye on other cars and instructs the
autonomous car to speed up or slow down depending on the behavior of other drivers. It
also assists in the automotive parking feature.
Camera. Due to the presence of visual cues and landmarks, the camera-based
vision system is used in a variety of research endeavors (Fuke & Krotkov, 1996).
Cameras are required in the intelligent transportation system for environment sensing to
recognize obstacles with respect to the autonomous vehicle’s location and speed. Twodimensional images using a single camera or 3D maps using dual camera could
stereoscopically pinpoint the available space for autonomous movements of the vehicle.
These images or maps from the camera vision system are used to extract quantitative
information from the scenes, to detect obstacles or to track the targets. The images are
segmented into a certain number of pixels. Each pixel is processed and stored, which
requires high computational speed and high memory space.
Global positioning system. The main sensor used for acquiring navigation and
positioning of the autonomous car is the Global Positioning System (GPS) which
provides information with one-centimeter precision. To navigate the vehicles
autonomously the GPS, with the help of sensors, creates precise maps of the roadway and
drives that in the exact direction. This GPS based route tracking could also detect other
vehicles on the same roadway and show their exact position on the same scene, as each
vehicle has a GPS receiver (Goel, Dedeoglu, Roumeliotis, & Sukhatme, 2000). Due to
signal disturbance and other interference from the atmosphere the position estimated
using a GPS may be off by several meters. Also, tall buildings obstruct the satellite
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signal. Fuzzy variables and rules are used to model the guidance system and correct the
computed trajectory (Y. C. Lee, June 1986).
Wheel encoder. The wheel encoder is used to keep track of an autonomous car’s
direction, speed and the distance a wheel travels. It could be helpful for precise
movement as it could allow the vehicles to turn exact angles or move exact distances. It
proves its high efficiency in planar environment as a dead-reckoning sensor, but is not
applicable when there is significant deviation from planar motion (Lapp & Powers,
1977). This sensor could assist for reverse parking through navigating into a tight parking
spot when the car is engaged in reverse gear.
A brief info-graphics showing the significance of different autonomous vehicle
components and their functions are presented in Figure 4. Also, a summary review on
autonomous vehicle functions and sensors is presented in Table 2.

Figure 4. Functional responsibilities of vehicular sensors
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Table 2
Development of autonomous driving assistance technology
Accident
causes
Rear
end
collision due
to
uncontrolled
driving,
monotony
driving,
fatigue
driving
on
long trips

%
of
Potential
crashes in
Solution
the US
Approx.
1.8
million
crashes in
1998 (S.
Park et al.,
2003)

Loss
of
control
leads to at
Drivers’ delay
least
9
in recognizing
percent of
or judging the
all
car
“dangerous”
crashes
situation
(Chellapp
a et al.,
2004)
Temporary
and
involuntary
loss
of
a
driver’s vision
by
falling
asleep,
fatigue, using
mobile phone,
chatting, etc.,
which leads
the vehicles to
leave
their
designated
lane

Intelligent
adaptive
cruise
control
system

Sensors

Applied
Algorithm
s

RADAR
LIDAR

- Reduced rear-end
Fuzzy
collisions
logic
or - Reduced fuel
neuroconsumption (1.1 to
controllers 10.7% achievable)
(Chieh- Maximized use of
Chih
et highway capacity
al., 2003) (John Hancock et
al., 1997)

Neural
network
(Zehang,
Bebis, &
Miller,
2002)

- Reduced crashes
- Critical situations
handled safely and
precisely
Automatic
braking

Particle
filtering
(Ponsa,
Lopez,
Lumbreras
, Serrat, &
Graf,
Camera
2005)
Global
Edge
positioni
distributio
ng
n function
system
(Onieva,
Alonso,
Perez,
Milanes,
&
de
Pedro,
2009)

-Reduced crashes
-Prevention
of
unintentional
deviation
of
vehicles from the
center of road
- Detect road edges
even in extreme
lighting conditions
(Wo, x, hler, &
Anlauf, 1999)

Automotiv
e collision
warning/
Camera
avoidance
system

About
11%
of
vehicles
failed to
stay in the
proper
Lane
lane
to departure
cause
warning
vehicle
crashes
(Chellapp
a et al.,
2004)

Benefits/
Improvements
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Table 2 (continued)
Accident
causes
Drivers’
misjudging
the
traffic
signs
and
signals,
or
disobeying
them
after
approaching
intersection
Lack of speed
control while
driving,
inappropriate
steering wheel
angle, unsafe
driving under
unfavorable
conditions

Unsafe
pedestrian
road
crossings,
inattentive
driving, delay
in response

%
of
Potential
crashes in
Solution
the US
36% of all
road
accidents
(Chellapp
a et al.,
2004)

Sensors

Camera
Intersectio
vision
n collision
Loop
avoidance
detector
system
RADAR

Almost 22
percent of
road
Electronic
crashes
stability
(Chellapp control
a et al.,
2004)

14.80 %
of
total Pedestrian
accidents
detection
(Porter,
system
1981)

Applied
Algorithm
s

Benefits/
Improvements

Neural
network

-Reduced
intersection
collisions
- Safe intersection
movements

Wheel
encoder
LIDAR
RADAR

Fuzzy
logic PID
controller
(Lagadec,
1980)

Camera
vision
Infrared
sensors

Shape
analysis,
Probabilist
ic human
template
(Porter,
1981),
Gabor
filters and
support
vector
mechanics
(Porter,
1981),
Neural
networks
(Hany H.
Ammar,
November
2000)
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- Reduced crashes
- Improved lateral
stability of vehicles
in
extreme
conditions

-Detected
pedestrian
movements
Guided
the
vehicles to a safe
route based on
pedestrian
movements

Risk Analysis
The development of risk management processes has become a topic of treat
concern recently as industries and businesses worldwide attempt to overcome potential
threats and ensure the safety of their systems. This risk analysis is used in many different
fields, including but not limited to: industrial plant design (C. Alonso, 1998), construction
project managements (Chapman, 1997; Ross & Donald, 1995), toxic goods transport
(Gadd, Leeming, & Riley, 1998; Tiemessen & Zweeden, 1998), hazardous site
management performance (Hurst, 1996), medical records and management (Bogen, 1990)
as well as software management (Boehm, 1991). In these risk analysis approaches, the
dynamic behavior of a system is considered because the active components can be
sources of failure and unexecuted fault prevention will result in failure (S. Yacoub,
November 1999).
Phases of risk analysis. Risk analysis can be performed at various development
phases and can guide future research for better safety in this field. There are three main
phases researchers consider in risk analysis methodologies (D. White, 1995). They are:
- Risk identification
- Risk estimation
- Risk hierarchization
Risk identification consists of two interconnected tasks, 1) disassembling the
whole system into small parts to make the process easier to understand and 2) examining
the behavior of those small parts. Components can range from a simple sensor, an
actuator, or the integration platform and database system to links between infrastructures
and vehicles. Once the components are identified, the failure rate of each vehicle part
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used for automation is determined to describe and quantify the risks related to the whole
system. Later in the second phase, these probabilistic failure values will help autonomous
vehicle design and maintenance engineers to estimate the significance of these risks as a
whole system and determine the system reliability. The ranking of these failure events
obtained through all the work completed up to this point is the aim of the last phase,
which is hierarchization. This phase detects the shortest possible route(s) to lead the top
event failure.
Elements of risk analysis. The three phases relate to each other by three elements
which are essential to carrying out the risk analysis. They are available input data,
expected output data, and selected method. After risk identification, the potential failure
probabilities concerning the studied autonomous vehicles system are collected. There are
seven classes of input data used by different researchers, which are:
[1] Plans or diagrams: The details of industry floor plans, i.e., production sites and
storage units are used in this class.
[2] Process and reactions: Mechanical and chemical features of the system, operation
requirements and kinetic parameters are considered as process and reaction
inputs.
[3] Substances: Physical and chemical properties of materials, material quantities and
their toxicological information are used as substance inputs.
[4] Probability and frequency: System reliability, failure types, frequency of failure
and time dependent failure rates are used as probability and frequency input data.
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[5] Policy and management: Safety rules and regulations are included as an input
model in this type of fault tree; examples could include but are not limited to:
transport safety requirements, operational safety and safety management.
[6] Environment: Topological data and surrounding information are used as input
data in this class.
[7] Text and historical knowledge: Historical information and previous analysis
results are included in this input class.
Including recommendations as an output of risk analysis, the outputs could be
classified into four categories. They are:
1) Management: The outputs of this category are recommendations, modifications
and updated operational procedures.
2) Lists: The lists of hazards, domino effects, errors, failure and damages, failure
causes, critical activities and accident scenarios are the outputs.
3) Probabilistic: The system failure rates, system reliability performances and
accident frequencies are generated as the results.
4) Hierarchization: The severity, system criticality, performance index and
organization index are considered as the outcomes of risk analysis.
The next step is the selection of a method, where there are two types of methods.
These types could be divided into three categories based on the approach selection (J.
Tixier, G. Dusserre, O. Salvi, & Gaston, July 2000). They are:
- Qualitative: deterministic approach, probabilistic approach and combination of
deterministic and probabilistic approach
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- Quantitative: deterministic approach, probabilistic approach and combination of
deterministic and probabilistic approach
The consequences and their products, the equipment and quantification of impacts
on human, equipment and environment are considered in deterministic approach. The
deterministic approach can be performed qualitatively and quantitatively. On the other
hand, the frequency of hazardous situations and potential occurrence of those hazards is
considered in probabilistic approach. Similarly, this probabilistic approach can be
conducted qualitatively and quantitatively.
Classification of risk analysis techniques. There are numerous techniques and
methods used in risk analysis. However, risk analysis techniques can be classified into
two types (J. Tixier et al., July 2000). They are:
1) Holistic Techniques: In this category, risk analysis techniques consider the
multiple partial views of the problem’s environment. A systematic upward movement is
carried out here to analyze the overall risk probability of the system. Thus, the risk
probabilities study can include: risk compensation theory, root cause analysis, risk
homeostasis theory, etc.
2) Reductionist Techniques: This category breaks down the overall system into
simplest parts and estimates the impact of those parts on the overall risk analysis of the
system. Fault tree analysis, cost benefit analysis, ontology-based analysis, Monte Carlo
simulation, failure mode and effects analysis, etc. are examples of reductionist
techniques.
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The risk analysis methods are plotted in Figure 5, a two-axis figure, based on their
classifications and frequency of use. This figure suggests that reductionist methods are
more frequently used in nature.

Figure 5. Classification of risk analysis methods: cost benefit analysis (CBA), fault tree
analysis (FTA), stability analysis (SA), risk benefit analysis (RBA), Monte Carlo
simulation (MCS), failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA), common mode common
cause (CMCC), root cause analysis (RCA), risk compensation theory (RCT),and risk
homeostasis theory (RHT)

Risk Analysis of Autonomous Vehicles
Risk analysis of autonomous vehicles identifies undesirable events and sequences
of events leading to autonomous navigation failure, which could lead to road crashes,
passenger fatalities, pedestrian injuries, vehicle damage, and external property damage.
Researchers followed different paths to assess the potential risks related to autonomous
vehicles. Risk analysis methods utilized for estimating the success rates of autonomous
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navigation can be categorized into three different classes. They are: i) situation based
analysis, ii) ontology based analysis and iii) fault tree based analysis.
Situation-based risk analysis method. The process of analyzing newly identified
risks or threats based on the solution of similar previous problems is called the situationbased risk analysis method. It is assumed that a complex driving situation can be reported
by entities, their attributes, and their connections among each other. In this method,
driving situations are described as traffic-oriented factors collected over temporal and
spacious patterns. A baseline model is developed to store the prior knowledge of relevant
situation-specific concepts as templates. The checklists of risk and their factors are stored
based on integration of background knowledge, and they describe complex risk situations
in a comprehensive way. Then, the risk identification is carried out as an ongoing risk
management task to accomplish the success of an endeavor. Situation-based risk
assessment method can be grouped into five steps. They are:
(i) Specification of risks related to autonomous navigation: Risk situations are defined by
using the entities and their inter-relationships based on expert background knowledge of
previously explored incidents. The relational dependencies need to be evaluated. The
collision between the autonomous vehicle and other road users could be an example of
identified risk situations in road surrounding environment.
(ii) Definition of model concepts: After identification of risk situations, the attributes and
their inter-relationships must be defined using object-oriented probabilistic relational
language. For example, the risk probability of collision with other road users can be
defined as a function of their distances and relative velocities.
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(iii) Construction of world model: The identified risk situations are then transformed into
a world model to represent the actual state of the world in terms of entities and
relationships.
(iv) Construction of probabilistic network: A graphical network of probabilistic attributes
and their casual dependencies is generated to reason about the current driving situations.
(v) Assessment of current situation: In this final step, the expected inferences are defined
and addressed based on the developed probability distribution.
The identification of risks related to autonomous vehicles and the reasoning
behind driving situations have been prioritized by researchers in previous years. To
estimate the domain of driving situations, Monte Carlo simulations were used in the case
of rear-end collisions (Hillenbrand & Kroschel, 2006). Hidden Markov models (HMMs)
were utilized to model complex situations in (Meyer-Delius, Plagemann, & Burgard,
2009), although a new HMM had to be assigned for each situation. Laugier et al. updated
the risk analysis for simple traffic scenarios by combining the Hidden Markov Model and
Gaussian Process Model (D. White, 1995). The later use of Markov logic networks were
improved to describe domains as interconnected objects for driver assistance systems and
specified the model as more compact and thus modular (Stiller, Kammel, & Lulcheva,
2008). Researchers also deployed a knowledge-based risk analysis framework to develop
simple risk patterns for autonomous vehicles using data collected by vehicle sensors.
Then, risk values were evaluated (Bogen, 1990; Swaropp & Rajagopal, 1999;
VanderWerf et al., January 2002). Other external sensors like RADAR (Jocoy & Knight,
1998), GPS position sensors (Miller & Qingfeng, 2002), wireless communication (Jihua
& Han-Shue, 2006) and cameras (Amditis et al., 2010) were used to predict collisions
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and warn the driver in case of threats. Collision risks were also predicted based on
intersections of future trajectories, and different shapes of overlapping regions considered
in different studies. These risks were identified by sets of points (Batz, Watson, &
Beyerer, 2009), circles (Ammoun & Nashashibi, 2009), polygons (Broadhurst, Baker, &
Kanade, 2005), etc. Then risk probabilities were estimated using the percentage of
overlap between the trajectories. Also to generate better predictions of vehicle trajectories
on curved roads, the differentiable continuous curves were adopted in (Katrakazas,
Quddus, Chen, & Deka, 2015).
Physical parameters of vehicles were considered for developing a risk assessment
platform for safe motion planning (D. White, 1995). In (J. D. Lee, M. L. Ries, D. V.
McGehee, & Brown, 2000), traffic situations affecting one road user were broke down
into sets of attributes, which were linked using a Bayesian network. However, these sets
were separated from each other, and the separation created issues while propagating the
effect from one set to another. Some other researchers allowed the interactions between
the sets of attributes to resolve this problem. Although Vacek et al. developed a model
using situation-based reasoning, their model could fail due to an excessive number of
situations in the model base (Vacek, Gindele, Zollner, & Dillmann, 2007). Different
algorithms were utilized to predict obstacles on the vehicle trajectories for both
intersection and non-intersection segments, including but not limited to: game theory
(Martin, 2013), mixed-observability MDP (Meyer-Delius et al., 2009), and multiple
criteria decision making (Furda & Vlacic, 2011). However, this risk analysis method is
computationally expensive and the success in risk estimation depends on the correct
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prediction of vehicles’ future trajectories. One example of a situation-based autonomous
vehicle risk analysis is shown in Figure 6.

Figure 6. An example of situation-based collision risks identification and evaluation
(Hurst, 1996)

Ontology-based risk analysis method. Ontology is defined as the specification
of a conceptualization of domain knowledge. It is the hierarchical semantic network of
basic entities and their inter-relationships based on a corpus of texts. In ontology, a
terminological box (TBox) carries the concepts of the domain. The TBox contains basic
attributes, their relationships and rules as well as constraints on attributes. Instances of
attributes and roles among such instances stay within an assertional box (ABox). Real
world data and attribute properties can be stored in this box. A language used to represent
the background knowledge in ontology is called description logic (DL), which is a subset
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of the first order predicate logic. There are several tools available, such as PROTEGE and
SWOOPS, which can edit and verify ontology consistencies.
Researchers applied the ontology-based reasoning for risk analysis of an
autonomous vehicle, as it is well suited for modeling multi-parameter traffic situations
and also for performing logic reasoning. Complex traffic situations, like intersection
traffic signal cycle times and phases, were modeled in the ontology (Keyarsalan &
Montazer, 2010; Pommerening, Wölfl, & Westphal, 2009). This method was proposed
and successfully utilized to represent different behaviors and depict the interactions
between the attributes of road surroundings without stability issues (Armand, Filliat, &
Ibañez-Guzman, 2014; Hülsen, Zöllner, & Weiss, 2011; Pollard, Morignot, &
Nashashibi, 2013). The driver’s ability, road surroundings and vehicle performances were
considered for modeling automated ground vehicles risk analysis (Pollard et al., 2013).
Another ontology model was proposed to deduce the risks for autonomous navigation due
to pedestrian behaviors (Armand et al., 2014). However, it was assumed that pedestrians
and control vehicle will obey the traffic rules, which is not valid in the real world. Several
sensors were maintained to acquire the information related to the road attributes, like a
camera, radar, GPS, ultrasonic sensors, etc. It is preferred to enrich the data by using
multiple sensors simultaneously, but the high price of multiple sensors, installation
complexity and computation load could be a drawback. The footage captured from the
driver’s perspective using a monocular camera were utilized in the proposed ontologybased framework by Mohammad et al. (Worrall, Orchansky, Masson, & Nebot, 2010).
The proposed ontology framework in this study is shown in Figure 7. The pedestrian
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behaviors in different traffic scenarios were examined here; however, the authors did not
consider other road users, weather conditions, and road surfaces.

Figure 7. An example of ontology structure for autonomous vehicle risk analysis
(Worrall et al., 2010)

Fault tree-based risk analysis method. The fault tree determines the potential
causes of an undesired event, which represents a safety hazard or economic loss. It is
suitable for a nonrepairable system where the failure of components is independent (Ma
& Trivedi, 1999). This risk analysis method was proposed by the former AT&T Bell
Laboratories (now Nokia Bell Labs), and was initially applied in the aerospace industry
(F. I. Khan & Abbasi, 1998). The fault tree analysis method encourages analysis of how a
particular component can impact the overall performance of a system and identify the
causes of undesired events (Ansell & Wharton, 1992; Ballard, 1992; Wilson & H. C &
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Keller, 1990). However, to understand the cause-effect process, a thorough review of the
overall system is required to conduct an effective analysis (Vesely, 1984). Therefore, the
fault tree starts from a complete system failure and moves backwards to identify all
possible causes. A graphical technique is used to represent the fault tree structure where
all components are branched off based on their interconnections with top level system
failure. These branches are assumed to be independent of each other, i.e., mutually
exclusive events (Bell & E, 1989). The analysis method has the ability to identify the
shortest route (i.e., minimal cut-sets) to failure of the top-level event. However, some
limitations of this risk analysis system must be recognized (Yllera, 1988), as the
reliability and failure data of components of the fault tree are required in the analysis and
these data control the accuracy of the analysis. To overcome this problem the researchers
proposed fuzzy mathematics to reduce the dependency on component failure data (Rauzy,
1993).
Nowadays, this model is commonly used to evaluate the reliability of complex
systems in many fields, both qualitatively and quantitatively, such as the systems found
in nuclear reactors and petrochemical industries (M. A. Chowdhury, Garber, & Li,
December 2000; Greenberg & Cramer, 1991; Lees, 1996; Qingyou & Hao, 1999). After
the Challenger incident in 1986, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) emphasized performing quantitative risk or reliability analyses using the fault
tree method for its space missions’ safety assessments. The US Nuclear Regulatory
Commission developed a handbook on fault tree construction and evaluation in 1981, and
this manual has been considered as the leading technical document on fault tree
application (Vesely, Goldberg, Roberts, & Haasl, 1981). Besides, this method has been

42

used in various other fields, such as aircraft design processes (Volkanovski, Cepin, &
Mavko, 2009), vehicular navigation failures (Bhavsar, Das, Paugh, Dey, & Chowdhury,
2017), nuclear power plant design (C. Alonso, 1998), industrial plant designs (DavisMcDaniel, Chowdhury, Pang, & Dey, 2013; W. P. G. Schlechter, 1996), bridge failure
analysis (Chapman, 1997), construction project management (Tiemessen & Zweeden,
1998), toxic goods transport (Hurst, 1996), hazardous site management (Bogen, 1990),
and medicine (Ammar, Cukic, Mili, & Fuhrman, 2000).
Recently, researchers have utilized fault trees to analyze the impact of
autonomous vehicle sensor failure on overall system success rates. In addition, the
autonomous vehicle features solely responsible for turning a traditional vehicle into an
autonomous vehicle has been evaluated using the fault tree analysis. Swarup and Rao
disassembled the adaptive cruise control (ACC) system of an autonomous vehicle and
investigated the causes of failures using the fault tree analysis method (Swarup & Rao,
2014). RADAR and the speed sensor, two very important components of ACC system,
were explored in this study and broke down into basic potential hazards. However, the
authors only considered qualitative risk assessments of the ACC system and did not
estimate the failure probability value of the overall system. Duran and Zalewski
investigated the causes and effects of failures related to LIDAR and the camera-based
computer vision system (Duran, Robinson, Kornecki, & Zalewski, 2013b). To estimate
the failure probabilities, the Bayesian brief network was modeled, and the Netica tool
was used for this purpose (Norsys). Figure 8 shows the fault tree’s graphical
representation as developed in the referenced study.
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Figure 8. A sample graphical representation of fault tree analysis (Duran et al., 2013b)

Researchers have identified different road variables, which could impact
autonomous navigation, but the combined impact of all the different vehicular equipment,
other road users, and infrastructure components was not investigated. The overall
summary of different approaches conducted so far is sketched in Table 3. In this research,
the fault tree analysis method was used to investigate the combined impact of vehicular
components and transportation infrastructure component failures. The mathematical
derivations of the fault tree method are described in the next section.
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Table 3
Summary of risk analysis techniques used
Analysis
Types

Situation
Based

Ontology
Based

Parameters
Authors
Considered
Algorithms
Hillenbrand Rear-end
et al., 2006 collision
and Monte Carlo
(Hillenbran crossing
d
& collision
at
Kroschel,
intersection
2006)

Limitations
- Only applicable in
case
of
simple
intersections
- Risks from vehicular
components were not
considered
- High prices of
Laugier et Collision risk Hidden
multiple
on-board
al.,
2011 assessment
Markov
sensors
(Laugier et based
on Model
and - High computation
al., 2011)
multiple sensors Gaussian
power required for
data
Process
parallel processing
Interaction with
- Only valid when each
Martin,
other drivers on Game theory
drivers
knows
all
2013
multilane
possible
trajectories
(Martin,
highways
and destinations of
2013)
other drivers
Platho et al., Road users and
Entities
were
2012
surrounding
Bayesian
separated from each
(Platho,
entities
network
other
Groß,
& affecting users
- Could fail in complex
Eggert,
situations with multiple
2013)
entities
Attributes based
Limited
driving
Furda and on
priori Multi-criteria maneuvers
were
Vlacic,
information, sen decision
considered here
2011 (Furda sor measuremaking
- High computational
& Vlacic, ments and V2X (MCDM)
power required for real2011)
communication
time decision making
Different
- Limited real time
Armand et relationships
Ontology
applications
al.,
2014 between design framework
- Depends on the
(Armand et vehicle
and
frequency of GPS
al., 2014)
various
road
receiver
entities
- Not compatible for
(pedestrians,
every driving scenario,
other vehicles,
only applicable when
infrastructures,
meeting entities already
etc.)
defined in system
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Table 3 (continued)
Analysis
Types

Parameters
Authors
Considered
Algorithms
Roads,
lanes,
Hulsen et al., traffic
signs, Ontology
2011 (Hülsen traffic
lights, framework
et al., 2011)
and other road
users

Ontology
Based
Vehicle
Pollard et al., perception,
2013 (Pollard visibility,
et al., 2013)
weather, traffic
signs and road
types.
Kaloskampis Estimation of
et al., 2015 risks related to
(Mohammad, pedestrian
Kaloskampis, behaviors using
Hicks,
& Camera feeds
Setchi, 2015)

Fault
Tree
Based

Swarup and
Rao,
2015
(Swarup
&
Rao, 2014)

Identification of
potential threats
of
Adaptive
Cruise Control
Risks associated
Duran
and to LIDAR and
Zalewski,
Camera vision
2013 (Duran was
et al., 2013b) investigated
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Limitations
- Fixed road geometry
was considered without
incorporating
uncertainties
- Qualitative analysis
- Did not evaluate in
real-world; only tested
in simulation

Ontology
framework

- Separate model based
on level of automation
- High computational
power required

Ontology
framework,
Gaussian
mixture
model

- Other road users,
weather conditions and
road surfaces were not
considered in study
- Data from video feeds
will
require
high
computational power
- Qualitative analysis
- Impacts of each cause
were not ranked

Fault tree

Other
vehicular
Fault tree and components were not
Bayesian
included
belief
- Limited to vehicular
networks
components

Fault Tree Analysis Structure
The fault tree is developed by disintegrating the overall system into its subsystem
failures, which later breaks down into lower resolution events. This process continues
until no further disintegration can take place. These terminating events are called “basic
events.” The failure of the overall system is referred to as a “top-level event,” and the
other events are linked to the top-level event with its basic events at the bottom, which
are called “intermediate/ casual events.” The top-level event and basic events are
interconnected based on the hierarchical and logical relationships between events that
lead to the failure of the top event. The schematic of the fault tree in Figure 9 shows these
logical relationships presented as “Gate.” The “AND” and “OR” gates are widely used to
illustrate the relationship between input and output events.

Gate

Gates

Figure 9. An example of fault tree structure

Besides the basic and intermediate events, undeveloped, conditional, and house
events are also used while developing the fault tree in many research projects. Different
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events along with their symbols and description are shown in Figure 10, which also uses
EXCULSIVE OR, PRIORITY AND, INHIBIT, and TRANSFER gates in specific cases.

Figure 10. Fault tree gates and events

Fault tree mathematical formulation. In this study the logical relationships are
restricted to “OR” and “AND” gates. An OR gate represents events that are mutually
exclusive events, where one of the preceding events could lead to the failure of the
overall system. In “Set Theoretic” terms, this is equivalent to the union of the basic and
intermediate events. The probability of the OR gate output can be formulated as follow:
48

𝑃(𝑋 𝑂𝑅 𝑌) = 𝑃(𝑋 ∪ 𝑌) = 𝑃(𝑋) + 𝑃(𝑌) − 𝑃(𝑋 ∩ 𝑌)
On the other hand, an AND gate represents a combined failure of all events
required to lead to a whole system failure. This gate is related to the intersection of two
sets in the “Set Theory.” The mathematical formulation of AND gate is given below:
𝑃(𝑋 𝐴𝑁𝐷 𝑌) = 𝑃(𝑋 ∩ 𝑌) = 𝑃(𝑋) × 𝑃(𝑌)
Summary
In summary, researchers conducted the risk analysis of an autonomous vehicle
using situation-based and ontology-based methodology. However, these risk analysis
studies were focused on vehicular surrounding components. Not a single study was done
on vehicular components until then. Recently, a fault-tree based risk analysis was
completed considering the failure of autonomous vehicles due to vehicular components
failure. However, this study failed to include the failures of infrastructure components in
the autonomous vehicles risk analysis.
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Chapter 3
Method
The research method featured in this paper focuses on utilizing the fault-tree
analysis approach to identify risks associated with autonomous vehicle failure when it is
sharing the roadway with other conventional vehicles driven by non-autonomous drivers.
Later, an online survey was conducted to justify the failure probabilities of components
through the literature review. Furthermore, a traffic micro-simulation platform was
utilized to determine the safety and operational impact of autonomous vehicle
deployment in a mixed traffic stream. This chapter presents the detailed approach
adopted for this research. A summary of the overall research method is explained in the
first section. Three separate but interconnected steps are followed in this research. These
steps are explained in three consecutive sections. The first step, risk assessment, is
described in Section 3.2. This step is further grouped into three sub-tasks. In the next
section, the online survey structure is explained. Finally, Section 3.4 concentrates on
traffic simulation development.
Research Method
The overall research method was divided into three major steps. The flow of the
method is shown in Figure 11. The risks assessment of an autonomous vehicle was the
first crucial step of this study. The second step focused on developing the structure of an
online survey to seek information to revise the failure probabilities collected from the
literature review and utilized in the first step. The survey instruments were prepared, and
after the approval from Institutional Review Broad (IRB), the survey was released. The
last step of this research was to develop the algorithms of autonomous vehicle navigation
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in traffic simulation environment. The micro-level traffic simulation could allow
development of an autonomous vehicle environment, where vehicles can be driven by
themselves without any human intervention. The autonomous vehicle driving behavior
was simulated to estimate the impact of sudden incidents in autonomous navigation due
to the risks identified in the first step of this research. The simulation results represent
real-world crash scenarios due to the failures of autonomous navigation and their impact
on other road users in a mixed traffic stream.

Figure 11. Overall research methodology

Risk Analysis
The risk assessment of an autonomous vehicle was divided into four sub-tasks;
they are: i) risk identification, ii) risk estimation, and iii) risk hierarchization. After
completing these sub-tasks, the risks were estimated using the fault tree analysis method.
They were then validated by comparison with real-world data.
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Risk identification. The first risk identification sub-task consists of a thorough
literature review. This task was conducted by performing an extensive review of
published reports and peer-reviewed conference and journal papers. This task also led to
identifying the sources of potential risks and how much of an impact each potential
failure has on the vehicle system as a whole. According to (D. White, 1995), four types of
information about an autonomous vehicle system and its components are required for the
risk analysis of autonomous vehicles. These four types of information are:
(a) Nature and characteristics of the failure sources,
(b) Chain of events,
(c) Pathways and processes that connect the cause to the effect, and
(d) Relationship between risk sources and effects.
Risk estimation. The next sub-task is risk estimation which can be performed
with various analysis methods. Although this study utilizes the fault tree analysis method,
other methods were discussed briefly in Chapter 2. After identifying the hierarchical and
logical relationships between the identified events in the previous sub-task, the fault trees
were developed to determine failure events. The fault tree was started with a top levelevent, “autonomous vehicle failure,” and then divided into primary events that could lead
to vehicle failure. Then, these primary events were further split into the events that could
lead to the failure of the primary events. Here, gate selection between the “And” and
“OR” gate plays an important role, because each gate represents a transition from a broad
failure to a more localized failure. This process continues to the breakdown of lower level
events until none of the events could be broken down any further, and the lowest level
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events were classified as basic events. The steps for developing the fault tree are shown
in Figure 12.

Figure 12. Steps for developing fault tree

Risk hierarchization. Along with determining the overall system failure
probabilities, the fault tree analysis method allows users to identify the shortest routes,
called cut-sets, which can lead to failure of the system within the tree. Each cut-set or
path can be obtained directly from the hierarchical relationships of the fault tree. In this
study, the identified risks were ranked based on their failure probabilities.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, inputs of risk analysis could be plans, processes and
reactions, substances, probability and frequency data, policy and management,
environment, text, and historical knowledge. Just as quantitative risk analysis of

53

autonomous vehicles was set apart as a primary concern here, so probability rate and
frequency are also considered important in this study. The ranking of failure risks could
help develop cost effective risk minimization strategies, so hierarchization was selected
as one of the four different types of outputs of general risk analysis. An analysis on
equipment and restricted parts of autonomous vehicles was required here, so their failure
probabilities were converted into numerical values. As a result, the probabilistic approach
was selected. Figure 13 summarizes the risk assessment sub-tasks.

Figure 13. Step by step methodology of risk analysis

Evaluation of fault tree model. A fault tree analysis model can be validated
qualitatively and quantitatively. The qualitative validation method considers the basic
event identification and their relationship with top-level event(s). The quantitative
method reviews and measures the failure probabilities (Tupper, Chowdhury, & Sharp,
2014). Finally, the risks estimated in the previous simulated steps were validated by their

54

comparison with real-world data. For validation, the real-world data available from the
California DMV autonomous vehicle testing records were utilized in this study. In
Chapter 4, details about three autonomous vehicle risk analysis phases are adopted and
their outcomes are discussed.
Online Survey
An online survey was conducted to revise and update the failure probabilities
collected from the literature review. The main goal of this survey was to interview the
subject matter experts (SMEs) or domain experts to seek further information, which can
justify the literature review. The Delphi survey method was used to conduct this online
survey.
The Delphi survey method consists of a multi-round interactive anonymous
interaction through the questionnaires among participants. The purpose of having
multiple rounds is that the participants will review other experts’ responses and based on
those, revise their previous answers in the following rounds. In this way the responses
could be guided to achieve an expected level of consensus in multiple rounds.
Developing survey instruments. The causal factors responsible for the overall
autonomous vehicle failure were divided into two categories, as previously mentioned in
Chapter 3. The first category identifies failure scenarios due to vehicular components,
and the second one focuses on the transportation infrastructure components. To collect
the intelligences of these two categories, this survey investigates the following two
questions:

55

Research Question 1: Which vehicular component failure would lead to overall
autonomous vehicle system failures, and what would be the probability of these
component failures?
Research Question 2: What type of transportation infrastructure component failures
would cause autonomous vehicles failure? What would be the failure probabilities of
infrastructure components?
The questionnaire guided by the Delphi survey method is treated as a medium of
anonymous communication among experts from different sectors, where the expressed
responses are shared without participant identification. The first-round questionnaire is an
open-ended solicitation of ideas. In the following round, the questions are crafted to
guide the experts toward an expected level of consensus. To reduce bias, the sequence of
questions was randomly generated in different versions. The inputs of experts in this
research helped me gather the additional information on causal factors as well as the
relationship between causal factors and the impact on overall system success rates.
However, these experts were expected to have different perspectives, which meant
viewing the autonomous vehicles from different dimensions. Thus, it was evident from
the beginning that it would be impossible to obtain a reasonable degree of consensus
without separating the experts into different panels. In this study, the experts were
divided into three different panels based on the nature of their work area:
i)

Automotive company developers: (for example but not limited to: Google,
Uber, Tesla and General Motors),
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ii)

University researchers (for example but not limited to: Stanford University,
Carnegie Mellon University, University of Michigan, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, and University of Texas at Austin), and

iii)

Component company personnel (for example but not limited to: Velodyne
LIDAR, Sanborn LIDAR, and US RADAR Inc.),
Because the Delphi survey population requirements are modest, each panel

contained 10 to 18 members, who are experts in the focus area of study (Hasson, Keeney,
& McKenna, 2000). To enable global perspectives, 20% of the invited experts on each
panel were chosen from outside the United States.
The Kendall’s W coefficient of concordance, a statistical test, was utilized to
measure the level of consensus. In this test, a high value of W (> 0.8) means that the
participants applied essentially the same standard in judging the probabilities of the
vehicular components or transportation infrastructure components. The steps involved in
this survey are summarized in Figure 14.

Figure 14. Steps involved in online survey
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Simulation of Autonomous Vehicle
The fault tree analysis results estimate the failure probability of autonomous
vehicles sharing the roads with human drivers and other road-users. However, it is
essential to further study how these failure probabilities will impact the overall efficiency
of the roadway infrastructures. Keeping this object in mind, micro-level traffic simulation
with an autonomous navigation environment was developed and analyzed using the fault
tree results in simulation. The autonomous driving behavior was modeled in traffic
simulation and the probabilities of autonomous vehicle failure were integrated into the
model. In this research, vehicle platooning was evaluated as autonomous navigation;
however autonomous vehicle lane changing behaviors were not included at this stage.
After modeling the simulations, the results of traffic microsimulation were imported into
a conflict analysis tool, which could estimate the reduction in crash frequencies. Finally,
the impacts of autonomous navigation failures were studied using simulation analysis.
The modeling of autonomous vehicles was split into four sub-tasks:
i)

traffic network modeling,

ii)

formulation of algorithms,

iii)

modeling multiple scenarios, and

iv)

conflict analysis.
It is important to mention that the traffic microsimulation software package, PTV

Vissim (version 7.00- 32 bits), was used in this study to model the road networks
("VISSIM 7 User Manual," 2015). The benefit of using this simulation platform is that it
enables users to develop and simulate specific user-defined driving behavior for either a
specific percentage of total vehicles or all vehicles. Additionally, the Surrogate Safety
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Assessment Model (SSAM), a conflict analysis tool, was utilized in this study (Pu &
Joshi, 2008).
Traffic network modeling. A segment of Interstate-476 in Pennsylvania was
selected as the study region, and its traffic network was modeled in Vissim. The study
area was bounded by US Route 3 near Haverford, PA on the north to I-95 near Woodlyn,
PA on the south. The geometric parameters (for example but not limited to: number of
lanes, lane widths, and turning radius) and designs were collected and modeled based on
Google Maps using the satellite feature. Figure 15 shows the four junction points of the
entire study’s road network. All related intersections and local road networks are in the
simulation model as well as traffic counts collected from the 2015 Pennsylvania Highway
Statistics Report, available on the PennDOT Traffic Information website (PennDOT,
2016).
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Figure 15. Traffic simulation model of I-476 in Pennsylvania developed in Vissim

The Vissim model includes 99 links and 186 connectors; totaling 49.87 kilometers
of traffic network. Fourteen traffic signals were modeled on entrance ramps.
Additionally, 232 conflict points were coded to represent the merging areas in the study
traffic network. The model was then calibrated by adjusting speed distribution, human
driving behaviors at merging regions and speed decision points by Hard Should Running
Clinic Team.
Number of simulation runs. It is important to introduce variability in traffic
microsimulation, because even on a specific segment of highway, it is expected that
traffic patterns will fluctuate based on multiple parameters, i.e., (for example but not
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limited to time of the day, workdays, weather, seasons and traffic crashes). With current
computation systems, it is not possible to generate a sequence of random numbers which
cannot be reasonably predicted (Bahaaldin, Fries, Bhavsar, & Das, 2017; Vattulainen &
Ala‐Nissila, 1995). However, in Vissim, a parameter called “random seed” can actually
initialize randomness in traffic patterns. Thus, a traffic microsimulation model with the
same random seed value can produce similar results for operational parameters (i.e.,
measure of effectiveness), such as travel time, network speed, and density. If the random
seed value is varied, then the built-in stochastic functions in Vissim will generate a
stochastic variation of traffic arrivals in the microsimulation. Furthermore, the results
generated from multiple runs of a single traffic microsimulation are required to draw a
conclusion with statistical validity. However, it is essential to prove that the results are a
true representation of the calibrated simulation model and not skewed towards a
statistical outlier. The average results of multiple runs using different random seed values
should stay within the true average range of the model, i.e., confidence level. It is
important to mention that the average results of multiple runs do not necessarily have to
be representative of real-world scenarios, unless the model has been pre-calibrated.
In this research, the initial value of the random seed was assigned as 5; then, this
value was incremented by 5 in each simulation run. It is recommended that the initial
number of simulation runs should be 10 to determine the confidence level of simulated
results (ODOT, 2011; WSDOT, 2014). Based on that, the base model was run initially 10
times using different seed values stating from 5 and then increased by 5 after a single run.
The average network speed and average travel time values for each travel time measured
segment were recorded to calculate the true statistical average. Then a Student’s t-test
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was conducted to validate the results collected from 10 initial runs. The t-statistic
equation is expressed as:
𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 =

𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒−𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟(𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒)

(1)

This equation can also be written as:
𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 =

𝑥̅ −𝜇
𝑆⁄
𝑁

(2)

where, 𝑥̅ = sample average
𝜇 = population average
𝑆 = standard deviation of sample
𝑁 = sample size, i.e. number of simulation runs
Furthermore, this equation was rearranged to calculate the number of simulation
runs required to achieve the average values of parameters within a predetermined
confidence level. Considering a confidence level of 95%, the following equation was
developed (WSDOT, 2014):
𝑆 2

𝑁 = (2 × 𝑡0.025,𝐷𝐹= 𝑁−1 × 𝑅)

(3)

where, 𝑅 = 95% confidence interval for a true average
𝑆 = standard deviation for selected parameters, i.e., measure of effectiveness
𝑡0.025,𝐷𝐹= 𝑁−1 = Student’s t-statistics for two-sided error of 2.5% with 𝑁 − 1
degrees of freedom
However, in this research, the network average speed values for different time
intervals collected from initial 10 simulation runs were used to determine the number of
simulation runs required to draw a convincing conclusion. The error tolerance was set at
10%. The number of simulation runs required was calculated using a network speed
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average for a time interval between 600 and 1500 seconds as per Equation (3). The
network average speed values and detailed calculations are presented in Appendix A.
𝑆 2

𝑁 = (2 × 𝑡0.025,𝐷𝐹= 9 × 𝑅)
0.8065

(4)

2

𝑁 = (2 × 2.2622 × 0.10×30.6636) = 1.42 𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑠
This calculation shows that 10 simulation runs were enough to achieve the
average of parameters within a 95% confidence level, which supported a statistically
validated conclusion. However, in this research total 11 simulation runs were executed to
easily address the simulation run that provide median values of the assigned parameters.
Furthermore, the average travel time value recorded for each time interval for
each measured travel time segment was used to calculate the number of simulation runs
required, since travel time was considered the measure of effectiveness for performance
evaluation. It was found that 10 simulation runs were enough for reporting results within
a 95% confidence level. However, as mentioned earlier, the calibrated simulation model
was run 11 times in this research. The detailed calculations are provided in Appendix A.
Formulation of the autonomous navigation algorithm. Traffic analysis in
computer simulation has become familiar nowadays with the advancement in computing
power (Pel, Bliemer, & Hoogendoorn, 2011; Rossetti & Ni, 2010). Researchers found
that a traffic simulation model could represent real-world scenarios after proper
calibration and validation, and the results of simulation were satisfactory (Gomes, May,
& Horowitz, 2004; Mahmassani, Hou, & Dong, 2012). The Vissim (version 7.00), one of
the micro-level traffic simulation software platforms, was utilized to model traffic
network in this research. Vissim was chosen because of its component object model
(COM) interface and its external driver model (EDM) availability to simulate
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autonomous driving behavior. However, this software platform has its own in-built
driving model based on the Wiedemann algorithm developed in 1974. This driving model
was built to predict non-autonomous driving behavior at the micro-level. Therefore, to
simulate autonomous navigation, user defined driving algorithms were required.
However, Vissim allows building a platform which can integrate the EDM algorithms,
coded by the user. In this research autonomous driving algorithms were developed and
integrated with the Vissim platform. These external driving algorithms were used to
replace the in-built human driving behaviors and simulate the autonomous driving
environment. This autonomous driving environment was used to assess the impact of risk
analysis results at the micro-level. Furthermore, this autonomous vehicle simulation was
applied to predict future traffic scenarios when autonomous vehicles would be
implemented in roadways. It is important to mention again that autonomous platooning
was considered in this research, where driving maneuvers like lane change were not
considered.
External driver model algorithm. The external driver model will allow replacing
the internal driving behavior and implementing user-defined behaviors. Based on userdefined algorithms, a dynamic link library (DLL) written in C/C++ is integrated with the
simulation model and was activated during the simulation run (code is presented in
Appendix B). In every single simulation time step, Vissim calls the DLL code to
determine the status of the specific vehicle in the next simulation time step ("VISSIM 7
User Manual," 2015).
The steps followed to develop and run the external driver model are described
here. At first, a new vehicle type was created in Vissim, and this vehicle type followed
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the autonomous driving algorithms to move one position to another position. To integrate
the autonomous driving algorithms, a dynamic link library (DLL) was created in C++
language. The DLL files are comparable with the EXE files; however, they are not
directly executable like EXEs. The DLL files require a platform/ program to execute, and
this creates interdependency. Similarly, the DLL file developed in this study was
executed in the Vissim environment, where Vissim communicates with the DLL file to
predict the next move of a specific vehicle type, i.e., in this case, autonomous vehicles.
This DLL file for autonomous navigation has three parts; they are:
i)

Main function

ii)

Header File

iii)

Resource File
The main function encompassed the algorithms of driving behaviors, and the

header file was used to translate the outcomes of algorithms into Vissim variables.
Finally, a resource file was developed to create the sequence of functions needed to
execute while running the traffic simulation. The main file contains three functions
required to move autonomous vehicles, they are:
(i)

Set value: Vissim passes current information of the vehicle,

(ii)

Get value: retrieve new information based on defined algorithms, and

(iii)

Execute command: Passes the request of execution to Vissim.

The overall flow of information is presented in Figure 16. Based on the current
vehicle information, algorithms identify the leading vehicle type and estimate the speed
of the leading vehicle at the time. Then a polar question arises as to whether the leading
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vehicle is a similar autonomous vehicle type. If the answer to this question is yes, then
algorithms estimate the distance between the current vehicle and leading vehicle.

Figure 16. Flow of information between Vissim and EDM

The distance between the current and leading vehicle is used as parameter for
creating a platoon. The threshold values for vehicle platooning are 6.6 feet as the desired
gap or distance and 3.3 feet as the emergency gap distance. If a vehicle is more than 6.6
feet from the leading vehicle, then the current vehicle will accelerate to get closer to the
leading vehicle. Hence, if the current vehicle comes within less than 3.3 feet from the
lead vehicle, the current vehicle will decelerate to increase the gap between them. The
architecture of autonomous driving is given in Figure 17. Additionally, the mathematical
formulation of the external driver model is explained below.
Mathematical Formulation:
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Speed Difference,
𝑆𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 (𝑡) = 𝑣𝑒𝑔𝑜 (𝑡) − 𝑣𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝑡) = 𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑔𝑜 𝑣𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒 −
= 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑣𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦

(6)

Case 1: If 𝑆𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 (𝑡) > 0 & 𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡) > 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑠 , then
𝑎(𝑡) =

−(𝑆𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 (𝑡))2
2×(𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡)− 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑠 )

(7)

where, 𝑎(𝑡) = 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡) = 𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑔𝑜 𝑣𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑣𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒
𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑠 = 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑎𝑝
Case 2: If 𝑆𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 (𝑡) > 0 & 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑚 < 𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡) < 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑠 , then
− 𝑆𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 (𝑡)

𝑎(𝑡) =

𝑡−(𝑡−1)

(8)

where, 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑚 = 𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
Case 3: If 𝑆𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 (𝑡) > 0 & 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑚 > 𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡)
𝑎(𝑡) =

−(𝑆𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 (𝑡))2
2×(𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑚 −𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡))

(9)

Case 4: If 𝑆𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 (𝑡) < 0 & 𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡) > 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑠 , then
𝑎(𝑡) =

(𝑆𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 (𝑡))2
2×(𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡)− 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑠 )

(10)

Case 5: If 𝑆𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 (𝑡) < 0 & 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑚 < 𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡) < 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑠 , then
𝑎(𝑡) =

𝑆𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 (𝑡)
𝑡−(𝑡−1)

(11)

Case 6: If 𝑆𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 (𝑡) < 0 & 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑚 > 𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡), then
𝑎(𝑡) =

(𝑆𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 (𝑡))2
2×(𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑚 −𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡))
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(12)

Figure 17. External driver model algorithm

Modeling multiple scenarios. The base model was coded with autonomous
vehicles’ market penetration level with 0 percentages representing current mixed traffic
scenarios. This percentage of market penetration level then gradually increased to
simulate future scenarios. For example: 10%, 25%, 50% and 90%. It is important to
mention that autonomous passenger cars are considered in this risk analysis research, and
other different transportation modes not considered for example but not limited to transit,
heavy-goods vehicles, and motorcycles. The Visssim vehicle types represent vehicles
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other than passenger cars, i.e., transit vehicles, trucks, motorcycles, etc., that were not
modified at all. They were used in Vissim vehicle navigation algorithms built into the
software platform. Furthermore, the demand for these vehicles did not change over time;
and hence their penetration level was constant over the time period.
However, demand analysis of autonomous vehicles was not included in this
research, since it is not within the scope of the research. It was assumed a gradual
increase of these vehicles will continue over a period of time, i.e., years. Furthermore,
researchers have predicted that the autonomous vehicles could increase the travel
distance, i.e., vehicle mileage, and hence, congestion will also increase as vehicle travel
becomes more convenient (Smith, 2012). In (Stefan Trommer et al., 2016), Trommer et
al. estimated that vehicle travel distance by 2035 will see an additional increase of at least
3 to 9% after autonomous vehicles are implemented on the road. Additionally, disabled
persons, elders, and children, who were restricted from driving altogether, will have their
independent mobility. However, these new road user groups, i.e., disabled persons and
elders, may increase the number of vehicles waiting behind the “red” traffic signal light
by up to 11% (Michael Sivak & Schoettle, 2015). It is important to include these
perspectives in simulation modeling, since network travel times could deviate due to their
impact. However, these futuristic problems are not within the scope this research and
their impacts have not been validated yet using real world data.
Conflict analysis. The objectives of conflict analysis are to identify the
improvements in traffic crash reduction after implementing autonomous vehicles on our
roadways to quantify the impacts of autonomous vehicle crashes on the overall
performance of transportation infrastructure. This analysis could be a platform where
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results of the fault tree models could be integrated with traffic simulation modeling.
Based on the objectives, the conflict analysis could be divided into two phases.
Crash frequency estimation. Using simulation modeling, the assessment of traffic
safety, i.e., crash analysis, is always difficult because of pre-built evasive algorithms in
traffic simulation software. However, researchers have developed effective analyses of
the relationships between traffic crashes and traffic conflicts (F. Amundsen & Hyden,
1977), where the intersection of two or more vehicles is defined as a conflict. Until
recently traffic conflicts were surveyed by trained personnel by observing a traffic fleet.
But this method could be questionable due to the surveyor’s subjective judgements
(Huang, Liu, Yu, & Wang, 2013). After a thorough research, the “Surrogate Safety
Assessment Model (SSAM)” was developed by a research team at Siemens ITS,
sponsored by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), to integrate traffic
simulation modeling and conflict analysis together. In this tool, a crash is considered
between two vehicles, which are on a collision course, but due to evasive actions the
crash is prevented. This model uses the trajectory files imported from microscopic traffic
simulation models and calculates the number of conflicts utilizing several algorithms.
The number of conflicts, types of conflicts, severity and location of conflicts are the
outputs of SSAM models. There are five parameters used in this model to estimate the
severity of simulated conflicts: time-to-collision (TTC), post encroachment time (PET),
deceleration rate (DR), maximum speed (MaxS) and speed difference (DeltaS). Three
different types of crashes can be modeled using the SSAM tool. These crash types are
separated based on the conflict angles between the vehicles. Figure 18, from the SSAM
manual, shows the angle variation of these crash types (Pu & Joshi, 2008). Three types of
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crash are considered in SSAM: 1) rear end collisions, 2) lane-changing conflicts, and 3)
crossing collisions. However, traffic crashes are certain, where conflicts are more
frequent then crashes. It is really important that the SSAM models are calibrated and
validated using real-world data to estimate realistic crash frequency values (Vasconcelos,
Neto, Seco, & Silva, 2014).

Figure 18. Three types of Crash in SSAM (Pu & Joshi, 2008)

In this research, the SSAM tool was used to estimate and compare crash
frequencies between two traffic models, i.e., specifically simulation models with different
autonomous vehicle market penetration levels. To conduct conflict analysis, trajectories
files were generated in the Vissim model after first running simulations. These
trajectories files with the “.TRJ” extension were originally a binary file that contained the
course of vehicle positions, i.e. trajectory, through the modeled traffic network. These
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trajectory files were imported to the SSAM model to estimate the frequency of traffic
conflicts. However, since the traffic simulation model was calibrated and validated using
real-world data the requirements of SSAM model calibration were overridden. Figure 19
represents the integration platform of traffic simulation software and the conflict analysis
tool.

Figure 19. Integration platform of Vissim and SSAM

In SSAM software, the default values of TTC and PET are 1.50 and 4.00 seconds,
respectively. These values were estimated based on previous research on urban signalized
intersections, i.e., low-speed road networks (25 to 30 mph). However, it is expected that
the perception reaction time (PRT) and maneuver time (MT) will be lower for
autonomous vehicles than for non-autonomous drivers. As a result, along with the default
TCC value, two other values, 0.9 and 1.2, were used in this research to investigate the
variation in the conflict frequencies based on TTC values. A PET value of 3.00 was
additionally examined besides the default PET value.
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Integration of fault tree and simulation modeling. Risk analysis of an
autonomous vehicle was conducted to estimate the failure probability of autonomous
navigation due to either vehicular components or transportation infrastructure component
failures. This failure probability represents the number of incident failures that could
occur per certain distance traveled over the period of a vehicle’s life. In other words, the
possibility of a traffic crash will be high after certain distances of travel, i.e., in this
research per 1,000,000 miles. Later on, the results of risk analysis models were integrated
in the Vissim model to estimate the impacts of these failures on the performance of
transportation infrastructures. However, the years a vehicle is driven before it dies
depends on various parameters, i.e., vehicle maintenance, annual mileage, and weather.
On an average, it is expected that the life of a new vehicle should be around 8 years.
Modeling the entire life cycle of a vehicle is not feasible in traffic simulation, not even
for one vehicle driving 1,000,000 miles as determined in the network modeled earlier.
Instead, it was assumed that all vehicles released in simulation would travel 1,000,000
miles collectively; then, a traffic crash scenario would arise. The overall algorithm is
represented in Figure 20. A visual basic code was utilized to generate the failure of
autonomous navigation, which is presented in Appendix C.
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Figure 20. Integration platform of fault tree and traffic simulation model

Summary
In summary, the three major steps, i.e. overall research method, in this research process
are described in this chapter. The steps for fault tree-based risk analysis are mentioned at
the beginning of this chapter, followed by the survey structure. The chapter also explains
the details of traffic microsimulation development. The analysis and results of the fault
tree-based risk analysis are presented in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Risk Analysis of Autonomous Vehicle
The comprehensive risk analysis of autonomous vehicles in a mixed traffic stream
is presented in this chapter, which can be divided into four interconnected sub-sections.
Because investigating vehicular components and analyzing their behaviors are the first
crucial step of risk analysis, this chapter starts with a detailed description of the
autonomous vehicle risk identification process. The next sub-section summarizes the risk
estimation, followed by risk hierarchization. The validation of risk estimation is
presented in last sub-section of this chapter.
Risk Identification
Autonomous vehicles are equipped with various sensors and actuators, and
communication platforms, which are interconnected to sense the roadway and other road
users. They comply with traffic rules and regulation and navigate in the traffic stream
without human intervention. Each of these components has its own failure mechanisms
and reliability functions. Investigating these failure mechanisms is required to ensure safe
navigation. To identify and analyze the basic components, risk identification was started
by disintegrating the autonomous vehicle system into each of its individual components,
and then analyzing their behavior. A detailed literature review of published reports, peerreviewed conference and journal papers, and other published materials was conducted to
estimate the failure probability of each component and develop hierarchical and logical
relationships between the top-level event (failure of an autonomous vehicle) and different
autonomous vehicle components.
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We have been seeing that the transition from conventional system to advanced
technologies normally takes place over a period of time such as the quality and extent of
computer upgrades (new models) from the 1960s until now. Therefore, it is expected that
the transition from a conventional non-autonomous vehicle fleet to an autonomous
vehicle fleet will likely go through a series of gradual changes over the years. This
suggests that autonomous vehicles will share the roadway with conventional vehicles
such as cars, transit buses, trucks, as well as bicycle riders, motorcyclists, and pedestrians
for many years to come. As a result, a risk analysis of autonomous vehicles needs not
only to include the failure mechanisms of vehicular components, but also consider the
impacts of transportation infrastructure component failures.
The risk identification process was divided into two subcategories to estimate
failure risks of autonomous vehicles due to different vehicular components and
transportation infrastructure components. The first category focused on identifying
threats from autonomous vehicular components, and the second category focused on
identifying threats from infrastructure components, including threats from other nonautonomous vehicles.
Autonomous vehicle components. In Chapter 2, the literature review presented
automotive features which could convert a conventional vehicle into an autonomous
vehicle. These automotive features then led to the development of the necessary sensors
and components of an autonomous vehicle. All these sensors and components were
categorized into four major subsystems: hardware, software, communication, and humanmachine interface. The hardware system includes sensors and components, such as
LIDAR, radar, camera, GPS, wheel encoders, and the integration platform. The sensors in
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hardware system are utilized to collect the surrounding information, whereas the software
subsystem consists of the data processing software required for autonomous navigation.
Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle to infrastructure (V2X) communication platforms
are included in the communication subsystem, along with communication database
failure. The final major subsystem is the human machine interface, which is used as a
personal assistant system that filters the human voice for commands to control various
autonomous driving functions. It is important to note that in this study; only additional
new technologies that convert a conventional human operated vehicle into an
autonomous vehicle were considered.
LIDAR, the primary technology being used for autonomous navigation, can fail
owing to several reasons, including laser malfunction, mirror motor malfunction, optical
receiver damages and electrical failures (Duran et al., 2013b). Similarly, camera vision is
another very important component on an autonomous vehicle, capable of providing
physical information about surroundings (for example but not limited to: obstacles, road
signs, and pedestrians). This system can also fail; however, misalignment, a missing
filter, dirty or damaged lens, and even improper lighting are only a few problems than
can lead to the failure of a camera. Detection failure of radar was estimated and
mathematically modeled so that the detection could fail two times out of 100 runs. After
real-world testing, it was estimated that the GPS system could fail due to variations in the
signal environment. Additionally, a wheel encoder could fail due to the loss of motor
stator synchronization and rotor positions. Furthermore, the integration platform is used
for communicating between all the sensors and units; thus, the hardware sensors
communicate with the data processing unit and the software unit, and any platform failure
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could be critical to the continuance of a vehicle’s autonomous navigation. The failure
probability of the integration platform was 2% when a two-state model was developed.
Since the driving responsibilities are essentially shifting away from active human
control to complete automation, the reliability of an autonomous vehicle software system
needs to be validated before deploying these vehicles on the roads. In an experiment, it
was found that software failed to generate a signal 1% of the time based on the array
definition language (ADL) statements. However, the database server could lose its
functionality due to operability and connectivity failures. In addition, the human machine
interaction platform could play an important role in the performance of the autonomous
vehicle. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) analyzed a dataset
of over 115 months and calculated the probability of human error (i.e., wrong commands)
over certain periods of time. Another study was conducted to estimate the rate of system
failures in detecting human commands and found that the detection could fail 1.4 times
out of 100 human commands.
Additionally, during location updates, long-term evolution (LTE) networks could
fail 5.88% times due to its control-plane failures. Other researchers evaluated the Wi-Fi
reliability with 10 vehicles, where messages were transmitted to and from moving
vehicles using open Wi-Fi. However, due to the high rate of package losses these
transmissions failed 5.125% times over the experiments. Besides these, database service
has a failure probability of 3.86% due to connectivity losses and operability failures. The
failure probabilities for all these components along with reasons for failure are
summarized in Table 4 based on findings from literature reviews. Furthermore, the failure
of the vehicle’s mechanical system was not in the scope of this study as it is not a part of
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the system that converts a conventional vehicle into an autonomous vehicle.

Table 4
Failure probabilities of autonomous vehicular components
Basic
Events

Description
Laser
malfunction,
mirror
motor
malfunction,
position
encoder
failure,
LIDAR
overvoltage,
shortfailure
circuit, optical receiver
damages.
Detection curves drawn
Radar
with respect to signal and
failure
noise ratios
Foreign
particles,
shockwave, overvoltage,
Camera
short-circuit,
vibration
failure
from rough terrain, etc.
System had to generate
outputs
from
array
Software
definition
language
failure
(ADL) statements
Encoder feedback unable
to be transferred, which
Wheel
can cause loss of
encoder
synchronization of motor
failure
stator and rotor positions
Real-life tests performed
with high sensitivity GPS
in
different
signal
environments (static and
GPS failure dynamic) for more than
14 hours
Using new empirical
Database
approach, connectivity
service
and operability data of a
failure
server
system
was
collected
Communic Wi-Fi:
Periodic
ation
transmission of 1000failure
byte frames (average
conditional probability of
success after previous
success considered)

Methods

Experiment
Type

Bayesian
belief network Simulation
Chi-square
distribution

Mathematic
al modeling

Bayesian
belief network Simulation

Failure
Probability
(%)

10.0000%
(Duran
et
al., 2013b)
2.0000%
(Swerling,
1997)
4.9500%
(Duran
et
al., 2013b)

Extended
Markov
Bayesian net
work

Experiment
(3000 runs)

Kalman filter

Experiment

Least squares

Experiment
(at
4 0.9250%
different
(Kuusniemi)
locations)

Generic
Quorumsystem
Evaluator
(GQE)

Experiment 3.8600%
(for
191 (Amir
&
days)
Wool, 1996)

1.0000%
(Bai, 2005)
4.0000%
(Goel et al.,
2000)

5.1250%
(Eriksson,
Experiment Balakrishna
In
IEEE (with
10 n,
&
802.11b
vehicles)
Madden,
network
2008)
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Table 4 (continued)
Basic
Events
Communic
ation
failure

Integrated
platform
failure

Human
command
error

System
failed
to
detect
human
command

Description
LTE:
Network
unavailability
during
location
update
in
mobility was considered
here
A two-state model with
failure
rates
was
developed to estimate the
computer
system
availability
Three
datasets
of
over115 months from
NASA was analyzed and
then validated by three
methods
(THERP,
CREAM, and NARA) to
facilitate NASA risk
assessment
System unable to detect
the accurate acoustic
command; Driver inputs
the wrong command, and
system unable to detect
wrong commands

Methods

Experiment
Type

Application of
CAP theorem Experiment

Markov chain Mathematic
model
al modeling

Failure
Probability
(%)
5.8800%
(Li, Yuan,
Peng, & Lu,
2016)
2.0000%
(Goyal,
Lavenberg,
& Trivedi,
1987)

Human
Reliability
Analysis

Experiment
(from
December
1998
to
June 2008)
0.0530%
(Faith
Chandler et
al., 2010)

Artificial
neural
networks
(ANNs)
on
clean speech

Experiments
(37 subjects:
185
recording)

1.4000%
(Dupont &
Luettin,
2000)

Transportation infrastructure components. Autonomous vehicles are expected
to be gradually introduced to general traffic with initially low market penetration rates.
Thus, the surrounding infrastructure of an autonomous vehicle including other nonautonomous vehicles (i.e., human drivers) can have a tremendous impact on autonomous
navigation. Failure will create a reliability issue for the autonomous vehicle. Recent
reports of autonomous vehicles testing submitted by companies that conduct autonomous
vehicle testing, indicate that the majority of autonomous vehicle-involved crashes are due
to human drivers sharing the road with autonomous vehicles (Delphi, 2016; Google,
2016; Mercedes-Benz, 2016; Nissan, 2016; Volkswagen, 2016).
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Autonomous vehicles have been tested in mixed traffic streams during low market
penetration to determine their level of performance, and non-autonomous vehicle
drivers are a major issue in mixed traffic streams. Thus, crash records related to reckless
driving, distraction, vehicle breakdown and fatigue were collected from traffic crash
reports involving non-autonomous vehicles of the Virginia Department of Transportation
(VDOT) and New York State Department of Transportation (NYSDOT) (NYSDOT,
2015; VDOT, 2015). The data were then converted into crash rate per mile of
autonomous vehicles (i.e., basic events’ failure probability) in the fault tree. In this
research, the market penetration rate of 10% of the autonomous vehicles was used to
calculate the failure probability of an autonomous vehicle traveling in a mixed traffic
stream. To consider the worst-case scenario, 10% of total crashes on a roadway are
considered to affect autonomous vehicle’s navigation in a mixed traffic stream. A sample
calculation is presented in Appendix D to describe the details of failure probability
calculation for an autonomous vehicle (AV), when it is involved in a crash due to
reckless driving, fatigue or distraction of a non-autonomous vehicle (non-AV) driver.
Incident rates due to poor weather and road conditions were collected from
VDOT and NYSDOT as traffic crashes attributed to bad/poor road conditions were
considered as transportation infrastructure failures. Bicyclists and pedestrians involved in
crashes were also included. A study in Hawaii found that 83.5% crashes between motor
vehicles and cyclists were caused by motorists and the other 16.5% were caused by
cyclists (Schroeder & Wilbur, 2013). Weather is a huge deterrent to autonomous
vehicles, especially since few autonomous vehicles have been tested in adverse weather.
Construction work zones crashes were also considered; particularly rear-end crashes
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(Ullman, Finley, Bryden, Srinivasan, & Council, 2008). Table 5 reports failure
probabilities of these infrastructure components, as reported in the literature.

Table 5
Failure probabilities of basic transportation system infrastructure components

Basic
Events
Nonautonomou
s vehicle
crashes
Cyclists

Pedestrians

Description
Crashes
due
to
reckless
driving,
fatigue, hardware and
distractions
9 million daily bike
trips with cyclists
responsible
for
crashes

No. of
Crashes

133,901 (p
er
100
million
0.0134%
miles)
3,090

Crashes
where
pedestrians at fault
during annual 42 8,625
billion walks

Constructio Among all work
n zones
zones 41.33 percent
were rear-ended crash
Weather
Adverse
weather:
related
fog, mist, rain, severe
incidents
crosswind,
sleet,
snow, dust/ smoke
Crashes related to
Road
improper
lane
conditions marking
and
pavements conditions

Failure
Probability
(% per
Mile)

36,208

4.0897×10-6
%

2.9337×10-6
%

7.6264×10-6
%

22,375
(per 100
million
0.0022%
miles)
656 (per
100
6.5600×10-5
million
%
miles)
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Risk Estimation
After estimation of the failure probabilities of vehicular components and
transportation infrastructure components, the next step of autonomous vehicle risk
analysis is calculating the top-level failure rates. According to Stanford University’s
Department of Global Ecology, “Risk assessment often begins by looking at one part of
the problem, usually the source of the effect, rather than considering the system as a
whole” (A. V. White & Burton, 1980). Fault-tree analysis approaches assessment from a
top-down approach, as risk estimation begins with the root cause of the basic/ primary
components failures and proceeds to estimate the failure probability of the top-level
event. Furthermore, this method can provide the shortest path to reach that top-level
failure from a single component failure. Because of these benefits, the fault tree analysis
model was utilized to perform risk estimation in this study. The previous task was risk
identification guided to analyze the behavior of vehicular components and transportation
components in mixed traffic streams, and to estimate the failure probabilities of these
components. Based on these failure probabilities, fault-tree models were developed and
will be explained in following subsections. The risks associated with autonomous
vehicles were categorized into two sub-sections, vehicular components and transportation
infrastructure components; thus, two separate fault tree models were developed based on
the risks introduced in the two following sub-sections. The two fault trees models are:
(i)

Fault tree model for autonomous vehicle failure due to vehicular component
failures, and

(ii)

Fault tree model for autonomous vehicle failure due to transportation
infrastructure component failures.
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However, these models were eventually combined to estimate the overall risk of failure,
i.e., failure of an autonomous vehicle in mixed traffic streams.
Fault tree for autonomous vehicular component failures. The fault tree is
developed by disintegrating an overall system into lower resolution events. This process
continues until no further disintegration can take place. These terminating events are
called “basic events”. The failure of the overall system is referred to as a “top-level
event” and the events linking a top-level event with its basic events are called
“intermediate/ casual events.” The top-level event and its basic events are interconnected
based on hierarchical and logical relationships between the events that led to failure of
the top event. In a graphical representation of a fault tree, these logical relationships are
presented as “gates.” The “AND” and “OR” gates are widely used to illustrate the
relationship between input and output events. Risk estimation quantifies the failure rate
of the top-level event and is represented as a percentage in decimal format. This
estimation takes all basic events into account and determines the failure rate based on
Boolean algebra. The algebraic equations that are performed are determined by the gates
used and the statistical model that was used when inputting basic events.
The first fault-tree model was developed considering the failure of an autonomous
vehicle due to vehicular components. The Isograph FaultTree+ software, which allows
various statistical models to model basic event failure probability distribution, was used
for fault the tree analysis ("Commercial Software for Fault Tree Analysis,"). For this
study, a “fixed probability” statistical model was used to perform the risk analysis
("Commercial Software for Fault Tree Analysis,"). After allocating basic event failure
probabilities and solving the fault tree, a failure rate of 14.22% was determined for the
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autonomous vehicle due to its components’ failure, which means that autonomous vehicle
operations could fail 14.22 times over its lifetime due to component failure. Figure 21
illustrates the fault tree with failure probabilities including only autonomous vehicle
components.
Fault tree for transportation infrastructure component failures. Following
the same steps applied in first fault tree, the second fault tree was constructed using the
other road users and infrastructure failure probabilities. The top-level event for the
second fault-tree model was “failure of autonomous vehicle due to infrastructure
components.” This model includes failure of the autonomous vehicle due to other road
users, weather, construction zones or road conditions. The infrastructure-focused fault
tree is illustrated in Figure 22. After allocating the failure probabilities of transportation
infrastructure components it was found that the failure probability of autonomous vehicle
could be 0.01571% per mile of travel.
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Figure 21. Fault tree analysis considering failures due to vehicular components
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Figure 22. Failures due to transportation infrastructure components

Combined fault tree. The sources of all the vehicular component failures and
also transportation infrastructure component failures were different. It is important to
mention that few probabilities were estimated after field experiments and where others
calculated probabilities based on mathematical modeling and simulation. However,
combining these two fault trees, i.e., considering vehicular component failures and
transportation infrastructure failures is the next step of this research. This follows the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) practice of estimating failure
probabilities of basic events by applying different methods, including experimental
estimation and simulation modeling (H. Dezfuli et al., 2011). Opinions of subject matter
experts are also considered in probability estimations (Safie, Stutts, & Huang, 2015). The
risk analysis of NASA’s missions often involves the integration of various risk models,
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which include failure probabilities computed by applying various methods (H. Dezfuli et
al., 2011; Safie et al., 2015). Similarly, to estimate the failure probability of an
autonomous vehicle travelling in a mixed traffic stream, the two fault trees developed
were combined to calculate combined results of failure due to failure probabilities of
autonomous vehicular components and transportation infrastructure components
estimated through their respective fault-tree models (illustrated in Figure 23) as described
below.
The failure probabilities of individual vehicular components collected from
literature were presented early in this chapter. However, when these components become
parts/subsystems of an autonomous vehicle, the car manufacturer will ensure that they
remain operational throughout the life of the vehicle with periodic health monitoring and
maintenance. Typically a conventional vehicle can be driven for 150,000 miles in its
lifetime (Lu, 2006). Based on this information, it was assumed that the life of an
autonomous vehicle is also 150,000 miles, and this assumption was used to estimate an
autonomous vehicle failure probability per mile. Given that the overall probability of an
autonomous vehicle failure in its lifetime is due to vehicular components the failure
probability was 14.22%. The failure probability per mile can be estimated as 0.0000948%
(i.e., 14.22%/150,000). However, the failure probability of this vehicle due to
transportation infrastructure components is calculated at 0.01571% per mile, as
mentioned previously. Furthermore, these two fault tree models were combined into one
fault tree to estimate the overall failure probability of an autonomous vehicle due to
vehicular component failures and transportation infrastructure failures in mixed traffic
streams. It was assumed that the failure due to vehicular components and failure due to
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infrastructure components were independent of each other and can be combined with an
‘OR’ gate to estimate the failure probability of overall autonomous vehicle system. The
following equation was used to calculate the failure probability for the top-level event
(i.e., failure of an autonomous vehicle) of the combined fault tree. The ‘+’ sign in the
equation represents the ‘OR’ gate. As shown in the following equation, an autonomous
vehicle operation could fail 158 times in 1,000,000 miles of travel due to failure of either
vehicular components or infrastructure components in a mixed traffic stream. The
combined fault tree is shown in Figure 23.
P(A) = P(VC) + P(IC) = 0.000000948+0.0001571 = 0.000158048 per mile of travel (13)
where, P(A) = Overall failure probability of autonomous vehicle system per mile of travel
P(VC) = Autonomous vehicle failure due to vehicular components per mile of travel.
P (IC) = Autonomous vehicle failure due to infrastructure components per mile of travel.
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Figure 23. Failure of autonomous vehicles in mixed traffic streams using fault tree
models

Risk Hierarchization
Along with determining failure rates, a fault tree allows for cut sets to be
identified within the tree which is the direct path from a basic event to the top-level
event. Once all cut sets are calculated the fault tree becomes valuable. The cut set also
allows engineers to determine which components to address in order to improve the
performance of an autonomous vehicle. The cut sets that are particularly important are
the “minimum cut set,” which exposes the basic level component because its failure will
lead to a top-level failure in the shortest amount of time. This mathematical method was
used to identify all combinations which are essentially the hierarchical sequence of events
that can result in the failure of the main event. The logical relationships between top level
and basic event are transformed using Boolean algebra, where all basic event failures are
considered binary in nature, i.e., either working or failed. Notably, all component failures
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were assumed to be independent, and failure rates were constant over time. Cut-sets also
help decision makers to prioritize which components need to be addressed first to
improve the safety performance of an autonomous vehicle. Once all cut-sets are
identified, they can be ranked with associated failure probabilities.
Ten cut-sets were distinguished in the analyzed fault trees considering the failure
probabilities of vehicular components and infrastructure components with the use of
Isograph FaultTree+ software. These cut-sets were ranked in order of their failure
probabilities. For example: hardware system failure could occur due to integration
platform failure or sensor failure, while sensor failure will fail if the primary sensor and
back sensor fail. Algebraic representation is given below:
𝑄 = 𝑃(𝐼𝑃) ∪ 𝑃(𝑆) = 𝑃(𝐼𝑃) ∪ [𝑃(𝑃𝑆) ∩ 𝑃(𝐵𝑆)]

(14)

where, 𝑄 = Hardware system cut set failure probability
𝑃(𝐼𝑃) = Integration platform failure probability
𝑃(𝑆) = Sensor failure probability
𝑃(𝑃𝑆) = Primary sensor failure probability
𝑃(𝐵𝑆) = Backup sensor failure probability
Table 6 presents ranked cut-sets with their failure probabilities. It was found that
the failure of the communication system could be the most vulnerable event of all the
basic events with a failure probability is 9.513%. Hardware system failure, which is
caused by sensitive sensor and actuator failures, was found in the second position with a
failure probability of 4.249%.
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Table 6
Minimal cut-sets of autonomous vehicles components

Rank

Cut-sets

Boolean Expression
System EV11+EV12

Failure
Probability

1

Communication
(GT4)

9.5130%

Hardware System (GT1)

EV1+ [(EV2+ EV3+ EV4+
EV5+ EV6) * (EV7+EV8)]

4.2490%

2
3

Software System (GT2)

EV9

1.0000%

4

Non-autonomous
Crashes (GT11)

Vehicles
EV17+
EV20

EV18+

EV19+

0.0134%

5

Weather (GT12)

EV21

0.0022%

6

Vehicle-passenger
interaction (GT9)

(EV13*EV14)

7.4200×10-4
%

7

Road Condition (GT14)

EV23+EV24

6.5600×10-5
%

8

Construction zones (GT13)

EV22

7.6264×10-6
%

9

Cyclists (GT10)

EV15

4.0897×10-6
%

10

Pedestrians (GT10)

EV16

2.9337×10-6
%

Evaluation of Fault Tree Model
It is required that a fault tree analysis model developed based on failure
probabilities collected from different sources should be validated both qualitatively and
quantitatively. The qualitative validation method considers the basic events identification
and their relationship with the top-level event(s) (M. Chowdhury, Garber, & Li, 2000;
Kuzminski et al., 1995). A quantitative method includes comparing the failure
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probabilities estimated through a fault-tree analysis to real-world data (Tupper et al.,
2014). In this research, the results from the fault tree models were compared with the
real-world data available from the California DMV autonomous vehicles testing records
(Delphi, 2016; Google, 2016; Mercedes-Benz, 2016; Nissan, 2016; Volkswagen, 2016).
According to California DMV autonomous vehicle testing regulations, all autonomous
vehicle manufactures and developers holding a permit to test must submit accident
reports within 10 days of the incidents and an additional disengagement report annually
(Pinto, 2012). The summary of collected crash and disengagement data from California
DMV is presented in Table 7.

Table 7
California DMV autonomous vehicles testing data
System Failure

Hardware
System

Software
System

Communication
System

Description
Hardware
discrepancy, issue
with
tuning,
calibration,
and
unwanted maneuver
Software
discrepancy—
unable to detect
vehicle or obstacles
Planner data not
received, drop off
on received data,
communication
evaluation,
management failure

No of
Incidents

% of
Incidents

Rank

288

17.8439

3

80

4.9566

5

642

93

39.777

1

Reference
s
(Delphi,
2016;
Google,
2016;
Nissan,
2016)
(Google,
2016)
(Mercedes
-Benz,
2016;
Volkswag
en, 2016)

Table 7 (continued)
System Failure

Description

No of
Incidents

% of
Incidents

Rank

Non-autonomous
vehicle behavior at
Nonlow
penetration
autonomous
level
of
vehicle crashes autonomous
vehicles
VehicleHuman
too
passenger
uncomfortable to
interaction
continue
automation
Signs, hand signals,
Construction
lane closures, and
zones
sudden reduction of
speed
Lane marking and
Road conditions adverse
road
surface conditions

68

4.2131

6

487

30.1735

2

Rainy, sun glare,
twilight,
cloudy:
poor sunlight and
darkness

Weather

31

1.9207

7

111

6.4125

4

18

1.1152

8

Reference
s
(Delphi,
2016;
Google,
2016;
Nissan,
2016)
(Mercedes
-Benz,
2016)
(Delphi,
2016;
Google,
2016)
(Delphi,
2016;
Google,
2016)
(Delphi,
2016;
Google,
2016)

The failure probabilities of cut-sets were compared with the percentages of each
crash type reported in the California DMV reports to validate the fault tree analysis
findings. Thus, these crashes represent the same basic event failures that lead to cut-sets.
Figure 24 compares the ranks given to each basic system failure event by the final
combined fault-tree model versus the real-world data. In Figure 24, all basic failure
events are ranked in a descending order of failure probability (i.e., the failure probability
decreases with the increase in rank). For example, rank of 2 for hardware system failure
suggests that there is a high probability of failure due to hardware failure compared to
failure due to construction zones (ranked 8).
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Figure 24. Comparison between the results of risk analysis and real-world incident
percentages

It is found that the failure probability of communication system (ranked 1 based
on the fault tree risk analysis) matches the real-world autonomous vehicle test data (also
ranked 1 based on real world test data). A significant difference in the ranking of failure
due to ‘vehicle-passenger interaction’ between the fault-tree analysis (ranked 6) and the
real-world (ranked 2) indicates that the software system and algorithms are going through
technological advancements which are captured in the fault-tree analysis but not reflected
in the earlier real-world test results. Furthermore, the lower ranking (i.e., higher failure
probability) using real-world data includes disengagement events reported by various car
manufacturers in which the primary cause of disengagement from autonomous driving is
discomfort felt by the driver (Nissan, 2016). The driver may experience discomfort and
disengage from self-driving to manual driving. The possible reasoning for that could be:
(i) The driver perceives actions taken by the autonomous mode are not safe; or
(ii) The autonomous vehicle has failed to recognize the driver’s command.
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However, with the improvement in algorithms and the increased adaptation, this
discomfort may reduce, thus reducing the failure probability (Calvo-Porral, Faíña-Medín,
& Nieto-Mengotti, 2017). The lower real-world rankings (i.e., higher failure probability)
of weather events and non-autonomous vehicle events, in the fault-tree analysis,
compared to the real-world reports suggest that autonomous vehicles have not been tested
in various weather conditions and at different penetration levels.
Summary
In summary, autonomous vehicles could be stopped 14.22 times over its lifetime
due to the failures of vehicular components. On the other hand, the failures of
infrastructure components also could lead to autonomous vehicle failure, and this failure
rate was calculated as 0.01571% per mile of travel. Later, the failures of autonomous
vehicles due to vehicular components and infrastructure components were combined and
the overall failure rate was 0.01571% per mile of travel. The fault tree results were then
validated using real-world autonomous vehicles testing data. Concluding remarks on the
risk analysis of autonomous vehicles results are presented in Chapter 7. Meanwhile, the
analysis and results of the online survey are represented in the Chapter 5.
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Chapter 5
Online Survey
This chapter is divided into three sections: developing survey instruments,
presenting the detailed steps needed to prepare the survey instruments, i.e. participants’
list and questionnaire, and survey results. The survey results are summarized and
tabulated. Finally, the survey results are analyzed using Kendall’s W coefficient of
concordance.
Developing Survey Instruments
The Delphi survey method was first introduced for handling the opinions of a
group of experts on national security issues; however the application of this survey
method has experienced different stages of development and modification (Rieger, 1986).
This method can be utilized as a judgement, decision-making aid or a forecasting tool,
where the subjective judgements of individuals could benefit from this method of
problem solving (Gregory J. Skulmoski, 2007). The Delphi method can also guide when
there is incomplete knowledge about a problem (Mbakwe, Saka, Choi, & Lee, 2016).
Furthermore, the method developed for this research focuses on consensus building
among the participants. Although there are variations in the survey focuses and
techniques, four basic characteristics of this survey method usually remain same (Rowe
& Wright, 2001); they are: i) anonymity, ii) iteration, iii) controlled feedback, and iv)
statistical group responses.
A flow chart of this survey is shown in Figure 25. The experts were grouped into
three panels based on their areas of expertise, since these groups have different
perspectives. The three panels were 1) academic researchers’ panel, 2) autonomous
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vehicle industry researchers, and 3) an experts’ panel from component companies,
including expert researchers from automated navigation sensor companies.

Figure 25. Autonomous vehicle Delphi survey flow
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Survey Results
A total of 140 people were invited for participation in the first round of survey
distribution. However, among the invited participants only seven experts responded in
this round: 50% of the responders were university researchers, 20% were researchers in
industry including the manager of a development team. In the second round, about 40%
of the survey participants had “more than 9 years” experience working in the autonomous
vehicle research field, and another 25% had “5–9 years” of working experience.
Survey participants were asked to identify the primary sensor failure which could
lead to overall autonomous vehicle failure. About 85% of the participants agreed that
LIDAR and camera vision could impact the success rate of autonomous vehicle
navigation, while 55% believed the GPS systems could be vulnerable to failure. The
participants varied widely in their selection of failure probabilities for different vehicular
components and transportation infrastructure components. For example, 60% of the
participants agreed that the failure probability of LIDAR could be between 3.01 and
6.00%. For camera vision, responses from 20% based their failure probability ratios on
three options: 1.01 to 3.00%, 3.01 to 6.00%, and 6.01 to 10.00%. The remaining 40%
selected “greater than 10.00%.” Moreover, 50% of the responders selected the failure
probability of the wheel encoder to be between 1.01 and 3.00%, where earlier it was
found that the failure probability of the same wheel encoder was 4.00% based on our
literature review. Even though around 60% thought communication system failure could
fail the overall autonomous vehicle system, none held DSRC failure responsible. LTE
communication failure was selected instead. However, participants also agreed that
autonomous vehicles could be vulnerable to software and human-machine interaction
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system failures. Table 8 represents the failure probabilities selected regarding vehicular
component failures by the participants in the first round of the survey. Percentages of
participants selected each range of failure probability shown.

Table 8
Results of first round of survey
Failure Probability Ranges (in questionnaire)
Vehicular
Components

< 1.00

LIDAR
Radar
Camera
GPS Device
Wheel Encoder
Integration
Platform
LTE Network
Software system
Database/ server
Human-machine
Interaction
Platform

3.016.00
60%
0
20%
0
50%
25%

6.0110.01
0
0
20%
0
0
25%

> 10.01

Other

0
0
0
25%
0
0

1.013.00
0
100%
20%
0
50%
25%

40%
0
40%
50%
0
0

0
0

0
0
0

0
60%
33%

60%
20%
33%

20%
0
0

0
0
0

20%
20%
33%

50%

25%

25%

0

0

0

25%
0
25%

Among the infrastructure components, the weather, non-autonomous drivers,
cyclists and pedestrians were considered as the reasons for autonomous vehicles failure
by the maximum number of participants (about 70%). However, the participants provided
a wide range of failure probabilities for these infrastructure components.
Analysis of Survey Results
Researchers considered consensus measurement as a viable component of data
analysis and interpretation in research, which measure the level of agreement achieved
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among the expert panel. However, consensus measurement also utilized a stopping
criterion of iteration, where group stability and individual stability were used as the
necessary criterion in many studies. Even though, many researchers suggested that
consensus measurement does not match with the original idea of the Delphi survey
method, the measurement parameter could be deployed in achieving agreement over
qualitative outcomes. However, to draw conclusions for quantitative outcomes,
inferential statistics could be utilized based on data and the normal frequency distribution
of dataset. Depending on whether the dataset followed a normal distribution, parametric
and nonparametric tests have been used in Delphi studies. Many methods can be utilized
to analyze the Delphi survey results and to calculate the level of consensus. For example,
the chi square test, McNemar’s change test, the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test,
Spearman’s rank-order correlation coefficient, Kendall’s W coefficient of concordance
and F tests. In this research, Kendall’s W coefficient of concordance was used to measure
the level of consensus between two consecutive rounds of Delphi surveys (Cafiso, Di
Graziano, & Pappalardo, 2013). Table 9 shows the interpretation of Kendall’s W adopted
in this study.

Table 9
Interpretation of Kendall’s W
Kendall’s W
W ≤ 0.3
0.3 < W ≤ 0.5
0.5 < W ≤ 0.7
W > 0.7

Interpretation
Weak agreement
Moderate agreement
Good agreement
Strong agreement
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The Kendall’s W coefficient of concordance was utilized to calculate the level of
consensus, and we decided to continue the iteration till strong agreement was achieved
(Kendall’s W equals to 0.7 or higher). For instance, 3 out of 5 participants selected 3.01
to 6.00% as the failure probability of LIDAR, and others selected greater than 10.00%.
Null Hypothesis: There is no agreement among the participants upon the failure
probability of LIDAR.
Alternative Hypothesis: The participants agreed upon the failure probability of Lidar.
For this hypothesis, Kendall’s W was 0.8 for the question concerning LIDAR
failure probability. This suggests “strong agreement” among the participants. Also, the
one-tailed p-value was 0.00302, which indicates no agreement among the participants to
reject the null hypothesis. Detailed calculation is provided in Appendix D.
Similarly, Kendall’s W was calculated for the failure probability of camera vision.
The value of W was equal to 0.2 which represents “weak agreement” among the
participants. With a one-tailed p-value of 0.41, it is very likely that no agreement was
reached among the experts.
Summary
In summary, the online survey was conducted to include the experts’ opinions in
risk analysis of autonomous vehicles. Even though, 140 experts were identified and
invited for their participation in the survey, only seven people responded in time. Due to
low response rate, the survey results could not be utilized to draw any strong inference.
Further remarks are presented in Chapter 7, and autonomous vehicle\ microsimulation
results are provided in next chapter.
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Chapter 6
Autonomous Vehicle Simulation Results
After developing the autonomous vehicle navigation algorithms, traffic simulation
models were being simulated to evaluate the performance of these advanced vehicles on
our roads in mixed traffic environment. This chapter focuses on analyzing the simulation
results and estimating the overall safety accomplishments over the replacement of human
drivers with autonomous vehicle on roads. The chapter is divided into two sections. In the
first section, the results of crash frequency estimation are described. Later, the impacts of
autonomous vehicle crashes on the performance of transportation infrastructure are
presented.
Crash Frequency Estimation
In the Vissim traffic simulation software, Interstate-476 (I-476) was sketched and
calibrated with the real-world traffic volumes where the autonomous vehicle penetration
level is zero. This model was considered as a base model and compared with the models
where different market penetration levels of autonomous vehicles were coded. In this
research, the autonomous vehicles market penetration of 10%, 25%, 50% and 90% were
modeled as mentioned in Chapter three. The automated platooning was programmed as
the driving feature of autonomous vehicles. This feature was embedded in simulation
using the dynamic link library (DLL) file, developed earlier and first mentioned in
Chapter 3. The Vissim model exported the vehicle information, i.e., current speed,
acceleration, and the speed difference between a leading and corresponding vehicle, to a
DLL file. Then, the DLL file evaluated the information imported from the Vissim models
and calculated the next maneuver of autonomous vehicles using the defined cases in
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Chapter three. Finally, the DLL file forwarded the corresponding values to Vissim to
execute the next simulation second in a microsimulation environment.
Researchers use different transportation parameters, i.e., travel time, queue length,
density, and delay as road network performance measures in transportation projects.
However, travel time data is the most preferred one among them, as this parameter can be
utilized in transportation planning, operations, management, maintenance, and
evaluations. Also, in this research, travel time was estimated and evaluated to compare
the performances of the overall transportation infrastructure after deploying autonomous
vehicles on roads and highways. Five travel time measurement segments were modeled
in Vissim to estimate average travel time over a certain period of time, i.e., 900 seconds.
The demographic location of these five travel time measurement segments are provided
in Figure 26 and their lengths (in ft) are in Table 10.

Table 10
Description of modeled travel time measurement segments
Segment
Number From Exit
63: I-476 South
between the Exit
1
on ramps
80: I-476 South
between the Exit
2
on ramp
94: I-476 South
between the Exit
3
on ramp

4

Mainline
9 off and
Mainline
5 off and
Mainline
3 off and

12: I-476 North before the
Exit 1 on ramp

To Exit
Distance (ft)
80: I4-76 South Mainline
between the Exit 5 off and
on ramp
19256.77918
94: I-476 South Mainline
between the Exit 3 off and
on ramp
9183.832427
110: I-476 South Mainline
Before Hwy I95 (3 lanes)
15326.8873
30: I-476 North Mainline
between the Exit 3 off and
on ramps
15304.756
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Table 10 (continued)
Segment
Number From Exit
To Exit
Distance (ft)
30: I-476 North Mainline 42: I476 North Mainline
between the Exit 3 off and between the Exit 5 off and 9173.011851
5
on ramps
on ramps

The traffic volumes assignment in Vissim follows a stochastic distribution
(PTVGroup, 2015). This distribution is set up so that a specific time dependent vehicle
can enter a link in a distributed manner. The time gap between two successive vehicle
entrances depends on the assigned hourly traffic volume. However, a random number
generator is used to estimate the time gap values from the software stochastic
distribution. In Vissim, a parameter called “random seed” actually initializes the random
number generation (PTVGroup, 2015). It is important to increment this random seed
number to capture the variability of traffic patterns. In this research, the initial value of
random seed was assigned as 5, and then this value is incremented by 5 in each
simulation run. Based on the calculation of the simulation run number, presented in
Chapter 3, a total of 11 simulation runs were executed for each autonomous vehicle
market penetration level.
Each simulation model ran for a period of 4800 simulation seconds, where the
initial 600 seconds and last 600 seconds were utilized as “warm up” and “cooling off”
time. These warm up times ensured enough time to fill up the road network and the
cooling off times provided time to dissolve the queue formed in the simulation period.
The simulation seconds in between warm up and cooling off times were divided into four
segments of 15 minute-time intervals.
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Figure 26. Simulated travel time measurement segments (Source: Google Map)—not to
scale

The travel time for each 15-minute interval was recorded for each of the total 11
simulation runs for the base model, where the autonomous vehicle percentage was zero to
total vehicles. The same step was followed for the rest of the simulation models, where
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autonomous vehicle percentages varied in between 10 and 90. Each of the five travel time
measurement segments were analyzed and their results were stored accordingly.
The raw travel time values were recorded for travel time measurement segments
and are in Appendix E. The travel times cover an interval of 600 to 4200 simulation
seconds with different autonomous vehicle market penetration levels. Also variations in
travel times due to different random seed number were tabulated. However, it is difficult
to draw patterns of travel time variations over the random seed numbers, because a
random seed number represents different portions under the distribution curve. Later, the
travel time values for a single penetration level are averaged arithmetically over 11 runs.
The average travel time over simulation runs with different random seed number
were then compared. It was found that travel time increased from the time interval of 600
to 1500 seconds to 3300–4200 seconds, due to increase of queue length. However, a
certain drop of travel times occurred in time intervals of 2400–3300. The average travel
time for different penetration level is compared in Figure 27.

400.0

Travel Time Variation with Autonomous Vehicles Deployment

Travel Time (Sec)

350.0
300.0
250.0
200.0
150.0
100.0
50.0
0.0
600-1500

1500-2400
2400-3300
Simulation Time Interval (Sec)
AV 0%
AV 10%
AV 25%
AV 50%

Figure 27. Average travel time over different random seed numbers
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3300-4200
AV 90%

It is expected that deployment of autonomous vehicles will reduce traffic
congestion and increase the roadway capacity, thereby reducing the overall travel time to
reach from origin to destination. Figure 27 shows that travel time was reduced after
deployment of autonomous vehicles on roadways. However, the reduction of travel time
from the base model was calculated for four autonomous vehicle market penetration
levels, i.e., 10%, 25%, 50% and 90%. It was found that travel time values were reduced
on an average of 8 to 9% after implementing 10% autonomous vehicles on roads. The
reduction of travel times increased with the increase of autonomous vehicle penetration
levels. Figure 28 shows the percentage of travel time reductions for travel time
Segment 1. This figure shows that an autonomous vehicle can deduce the travel time by
about 51% with a market penetration level of 90%.

Travel Time Reduction with AV Percentage
Travel Time Reduction (in %)

60.0
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40.0
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Time Interval (1500-2400)
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0.0

Time Interval (3300-4200)

AV 10%

AV 25%

AV 50%

AV 90%
Autonomous Vehicle Market Penetration Level

Figure 28. Travel time reduction percentages over autonomous vehicle market shares for
travel time measurement in segment 1
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Similar steps were followed for the rest of the four travel time segments. For
travel time Segment 2, the travel time reductions varied from range 4% to 51%. With
10% autonomous vehicles, travel times were reduced by about 4% and those values were
reduced by about 10 and 30% with 25 and 50% autonomous vehicles. The reductions in
travel time for Segment 2 are plotted in Figure 29.
Figure 30 shows that the travel time reductions for travel time Segment 3 after
autonomous vehicle deployment followed similar trends as noted for previous segments.
A 14% travel time deduction went into effect after implementing autonomous vehicles as
10 percent of total vehicles. These travel time reductions increased over the increments of
the autonomous vehicle market penetration levels.
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Figure 29. Travel time reduction percentages over autonomous vehicle market shares for
travel time measurement in segment 2
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Figure 30. Travel time reduction percentages over autonomous vehicle market shares for
tavel time measurement in segment 3
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Figure 31. Travel time reduction percentages over autonomous vehicle market shares for
travel time measurement in segment 4
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Figure 32. Travel time reduction percentages over autonomous vehicle market shares for
travel time measurement in segment 5

The travel time values were lowered for travel time Segments 4 and 5 by
increment of the autonomous vehicles market shares, shown in Figure 31 and 32
respectively. For travel time measurement Segment 4, the overall travel time was
trimmed by about 62% with an autonomous vehicle penetration level of 90%, and this
value was around 54% for travel time Segment 5.
After the performance evaluation, the trajectory files developed during Vissim
simulation runs were imported into SSAM software. Five models were developed in this
software for five autonomous vehicle penetration levels. In this research, three types of
conflicts were considered for safety evaluation, crossing conflicts, lane change conflicts
and rear end conflicts, as mentioned in Chapter 3. However, the default values of TTC
and PET were utilized first. The 11 trajectory files were imported in each SSAM model,
where each model represents a single autonomous vehicle penetration level. In SSAM,
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each trajectory file was evaluated separately and recorded. The conflicts analysis results
are presented in Appendix F, where TTC = 1.5 seconds and PET = 4.0 seconds.
After analyzing trajectory files in SSAM, the results were validated using
student’s t-test. To perform this statistical test, two autonomous vehicle penetration levels
were considered, they were 0% and 10%. The null hypothesis was the mean of total
conflicts calculated from 11simulation runs for 0% autonomous vehicle penetration level
was equal to the mean of total conflicts calculated for 10% autonomous vehicle
penetration level. With 95% confidence level, it was found that the mean of total conflicts
for 10% autonomous vehicle penetration level was estimated to be lessened than the same
value for 0% autonomous vehicle penetration level (with t-statistic = 5.8045 and two-tail
p-value = 1.115 × 10−5). The means of total conflicts were 143,677 and 123,455
respectively for autonomous vehicle penetration level 0% and 10%.
It was found that total numbers of conflicts were decreased with the increase of
autonomous vehicle market penetration levels. However, the number of lane change
conflicts increased by 157 conflicts after moving to the 10% autonomous vehicles
scenario from the 0% autonomous vehicles included. The possible reasoning is
autonomous vehicles were engaged more on lane changing behaviors as the chances of
platooning were low due to low autonomous vehicle penetration. The comparison of the
estimated conflicts among different autonomous vehicle penetration levels with 95%
confidence is shown in Figure 33.
The frequency of crossing conflicts reduced 49% after implementing 10%
autonomous vehicles on the roadways. This reduction value increased to 96% after
increasing the autonomous vehicle percentage to 90%. The frequency of lane change
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conflicts increased by 0.5% initially, after implementing 10% autonomous vehicles into
the total vehicle traffic mix. However, the lane change conflicts started to reduce after
25% autonomous vehicle penetration, and reduced by approximately 90% after deploying
autonomous vehicles as 90% of the total vehicle traffic mix. Moreover, rear-end conflicts
were reduced by 14% to 73% depending on the percentage levels of increase in the
autonomous vehicle population being monitored in Chapter 3.

Conflict Frequency Reduction with Autonomous
Vehicles Deployment
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Percentage Reduction in Conflict
Frequency (%)
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Figure 33. Conflict reduction frequency with the increase of autonomous vehicle
population in mainstream traffic mix

Later, the variation of conflict frequencies with different TTC and PET values
were evaluated. In this research, three values of TTC, i.e. 0.9, 1.2 and 1.5 seconds, and
two values of PET, i.e., 3.0 and 4.0 seconds were utilized to generate the trend of conflict
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reduction with different percentages of autonomous vehicles, i.e. 0%, 10%, 25%, 50%
and 90%. The variations in conflict frequency reductions with different TTCs and PETs
are presented in Tables 11 and 12.
In Table 11, conflict frequency was reduced with the decrease of TTC and
retention of the same PET. When TTC = 0.9 seconds, a more limited conflicts region was
evaluated than when TTC = 1.5 seconds, so the number of conflicts was less for TTC =
0.9 seconds than for TTC = 1.5 seconds. However, these numbers of conflicts were
reduced by the increase of autonomous vehicle penetration levels into the mainstream
traffic mix. The conflict frequency was reduced by 61% with 90% autonomous vehicles
when TTC was 0.9 seconds, and this value was 68% and 73% when TTC = 1.2 and 1.5
seconds, respectively.

Table 11
Variations in conflict frequency reductions when TTC (= 0.9, 1.2 and 1.5) and when PET
(= 4.0)
TTC = 0.9 & PET =
TTC = 1.5 & PET =
4.0
TTC = 1.2 & PET = 4.0
4.0
AV
Total
%
Total
%
Total
%
Penetration Conflicts Reduction Conflicts Reduction Conflicts Reduction
AV 0%
958362
-1219196
-1580449
-AV 10%
519831
45.76
843649
30.80
1358008
14.07
AV 25%
465888
51.39
632249
48.14
892703
43.52
AV 50%
432922
54.83
469520
61.49
531988
66.34
AV 90%
366993
61.71
385112
68.41
413636
73.83

Table 12 presents similar conflicts analysis with different PET values, which was
3.0 seconds. Notably, the number of total conflicts when PET = 3.0 seconds were similar
as the total conflicts when PET = 4.0, but this was only when autonomous vehicle
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penetration level was 0%. However, for other autonomous vehicle penetration levels, the
numbers of total conflicts when PET = 3.0 seconds varied significantly and were actually
lower than similar values when PET = 4.0 seconds. With 90% autonomous vehicles, the
total conflicts were reduced by 61, 69 and 74% when TTC values were 0.9, 1.2 and 1.5
seconds respectively, while PET values remained same as when PET = 3.0 seconds.

Table 12
Variations in conflict frequency reductions when TTC (= 0.9, 1.2 and 1.5) and when PET
(= 3.0)
TTC = 1.2 & PET =
TTC = 1.5 & PET =
TTC = 0.9 & PET = 3.0
3.0
3.0
AV
Total
%
Total
%
Total
%
Penetration Conflicts Reduction Conflicts Reduction Conflicts Reduction
AV 0%
958362
-1219196
-1580449
-AV 10%
475523
50.38
654373
46.33
982021
37.86
AV 25%
444343
53.64
539091
55.78
707800
55.22
AV 50%
428933
55.24
451511
62.97
493747
68.76
AV 90%
365144
61.90
376723
69.10
396734
74.90

Researchers identified that the number of conflicts calculated using SSAM can be
significantly correlated with actual crash data (Archer, 2005; Dijkstra et al., 2010;
Gettman & Head, 2003). However, Vogt utilized coefficient of determination (𝑅 2 ) to
measure this correlation between SSAM predicted conflict results and actual crash data,
and found that it varied within a range of 0.31 and 0.51 depending on road segment type,
with an average of 𝑅 2 = 0.41for all road types, i.e. urban and rural (Vogt, 1999).
Additionally it was found that a mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) value of 18% in
prediction performance of SSAM models (Huang et al., 2013). It is also important to
mention that even for same road segments SSAM predicted different values of conflicts
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when trajectory files are generated from different traffic simulation software, i.e. Vissim,
Aimsun, Paramics and Texas. For instance, a study found that SSAM estimated 10 times
more conflicts after analyzing imported files from Texas than Vissim (Gettman & Head,
2008). Though, SSAM prediction models demonstrate a success in analysis of proposed
traffic facilities and comparison between two alternatives, the results of these models are
not definitive, more likely qualitative. It is recommended that the SSAM should be
utilized to rank the proposed surrogate measures, rather than estimating number of
crashes (Gettman & Head, 2008).
Integration of Fault Tree and Simulation Modeling
The second phase of simulation analysis was measuring the impact of
autonomous vehicle failures in mixed traffic streams. The similar DLL file was utilized
here to simulate autonomous vehicle platooning. In this phase, the autonomous vehicle
penetration level was considered 10% as the fault tree risk analysis models were
developed assuming an autonomous vehicle penetration level of 10%. However, an
additional visual basic code was used to monitor and control the maneuvers of
autonomous vehicles. In fault tree models, it was determined that autonomous vehicles
could fail to navigate autonomously 158 times in one million miles. Based on this
information it could be reported that autonomous vehicle can drive an average 6,329
miles, i.e., 1,000,000/158, before a failure occurs. As mentioned in chapter three, an
autonomous vehicle was randomly selected to fail, when total distances covered by all
vehicles exceeded 6,329 miles. It was not possible to simulate one vehicle to cover the
entire length of 6329 over a certain period within the limited the length of roadways in
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the selected study region. To resolve this issue, the distances covered by all vehicles were
selected to control autonomous vehicle failure scenarios.
The simulation was run between 600 to 4200 simulation seconds; however, the
time interval used was 100 seconds in this phase to capture a more accurate variation in
travel time. The random seed value was assigned 1, and that value remained the same in
both crash and non-crash scenarios. However, within the time frame and the limited
region of roadways there were two simulated crashes modeled on the monitored
roadways, when the total distances covered by all autonomous vehicles were 6,329 and
12,865 respectively. It was assumed that the crashed vehicle would remain at velocity = 0
mph on the incident location for 180 seconds before the emergency response team
appeared. After this response period the crashed vehicle would be removed from the
traffic network using a Visual Basic code.
The travel time results for travel time measurement Segment 1 collected from
Vissim are presented in Figure 34. The travel time values were exactly equal for two
simulation runs (since they both had the same random seed number), until the failure of
the autonomous vehicle occurred. The first autonomous vehicle incident occurred on
another travel time segment path (not on the Segment 1 travel time), so that incident did
not impact the Segment 1 performance. However, the second failure happened in the
Segment 1 time interval of 3700-3800 and that impacted travel time results. The travel
times between the failure and non-failure scenarios varied by 0.24%, and this was
significantly lower. However, large scale modeling with multiple crash scenarios led to
some conclusions.
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Figure 34. Variation of travel time between failure and non-failure scenarios

Summary
In summary, the autonomous vehicles’ microsimulation results were presented in
this chapter. It also covered the safety and operational benefits of deploying these
vehicles on our roads and highways. To introduce randomness in simulation, random
seed values were varied within a wide range of 5 to 55. Thus, the travel time from origin
to destination could be reduced by 50% after deploying 90% autonomous vehicles of the
total vehicles available for this study. Furthermore, traffic crashes could be reduced by
replacing human drivers with autonomous vehicles. With a 90% autonomous vehicle
penetration level, 73% of all conflicts were eliminated there by saving human lives and
avoiding injuries and property damage. Remarks on the simulation results are presented
in Chapter 7: Conclusions and recommendations.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Recommendations
The first step of this thesis was to identify the potential sources of risks associated
with the failure of autonomous vehicle navigation. The failure of any single component
that could lead to the failure of the overall autonomous system was considered and
evaluated. Then, the fault tree-based risk analysis method was utilized to analyze the
performance of the autonomous vehicle system. The reliability of each autonomous
vehicle component was determined through the comprehensive literature review. The
failure probabilities of vehicular components were plugged into the developed fault tree
structure and the analysis was run in the software to identify the most critical
components. These component failures could lead to overall system crashes in the
shortest possible time. Autonomous vehicle navigation could be stopped due to the
failures of either vehicular components or transportation infrastructure components. The
combined failure probability was determined to be 0.0158048% per mile of travel.
Furthermore, the autonomous vehicle lifetime status value was projected to be capable of
158 failure incidents in 1,000,000 miles of travel due to failure of either vehicular
components, or infrastructure components in a mixed traffic stream. These results could
be used to develop risk minimization strategies to eliminate or reduce system failures and
finally ensure safety to the passengers of autonomous vehicles. Furthermore, the results
of fault-based risk analysis were quantitatively validated with the real-world data of
autonomous vehicle testing, collected from the California DMV webserver.
However, reckless human drivers were found to be one of most critical factors
affecting autonomous vehicle navigation. They are the dominant concern for autonomous
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vehicles in a mixed traffic stream. Yet, at the initial stage of autonomous vehicle
deployment, these advanced vehicles need to share the roads and highways with nonautonomous drivers. Based on the results of this research, the policymakers should
develop certain rules and regulations to facilitate the sharing of roads and highways.
Researchers recommend separate lanes for autonomous and non-autonomous drivers on
multilane sections of roadways as one potential solution (Chen, He, Yin, & Du, 2017),
(Turnbull, 2015). Other researchers claimed that installation of black boxes in
autonomous vehicles to record the sensors data and surrounding information, could be
useful for crash investigations after collisions between autonomous vehicles and
conventional vehicles driven by non-autonomous drivers (Nothdurft et al., 2011).
However, further research is needed to confirm the advantages and hence, the
applicability of these solutions.
The second step was an online survey seeking further information of the vehicular
components failure probabilities from the subject matter experts. The Delphi survey
method was utilized to prepare the survey framework. The benefit of this survey method
was to develop multi-round anonymous interactive participation through questionnaires.
However, only seven experts responded among the 140 experts invited to participate in
the online survey. The survey results showed that experts agreed “strongly” on the
question asking the failure probability of LIDAR, whereas “weak agreement” was found
in the case of a camera failure probability value. However, due to the small participation
pool, the survey results are not recommended to represent the majority of expert’
opinions nor to draw a strong inference due to the limited number of responses.
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Traffic microsimulation was carried out in the third step of this thesis. The
algorithms were developed and then utilized to model autonomous navigation in a
microscopic traffic simulation environment. A segment of interstate highway in
Pennsylvania was modeled as the study region. Then, the traffic model was calibrated
and validated to represent the real-world traffic scenarios. The gradual increase of
autonomous vehicle market penetration level was drawn by using different percentages of
autonomous vehicle among all transportation modes, i.e. 0%, 10%, 25%, 50% and 90%.
Five travel time segments of different lengths and directions were designed and
evaluated with different autonomous vehicle penetration levels. To generate randomness
in simulation results the random seed number was varied within a range of 5 to 55. After
executing the simulation with different autonomous vehicle-penetration scenarios, the
travel times for each 15-minute interval were recorded. After analyzing the travel time
data, it was found that autonomous vehicle can reduce travel time by 51 to 64% with a
90% market penetration level. However, the trajectory files generated by traffic
simulation were exported to investigate the safety of autonomous vehicles and estimate
the conflict frequencies. It was found that about 73% of total conflicts which could result
in a traffic crash could be avoided by replacing 90% of human drivers with autonomous
vehicles. Moreover, it was found that conflict frequencies fluctuated with the change in
TTC and PET values. Finally, a comparison between a failure and non-failure scenario of
an autonomous vehicle was drawn to integrate fault tree analysis results in simulation.
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Recommendations
- In this thesis it was not possible to conduct statistical validation due to limited
availability of autonomous vehicle testing data. Further research is recommended for
comparing the fault tree-based risk analysis results with real-world risk analyses.
- In this research, all the vehicular components were assumed to represent an independent
and individual component. The interdependency among the vehicular components was
not considered. However, it is recommended that the interdependency among these
components should be investigated before integrating into another fault tree analysis.
Also, the developed fault tree should be revised based on the interdependency analysis.
- The failure probabilities of vehicular components were assumed to be constant over the
lifetime of these components. However, the lifetime performance of these components
could vary. Variation in the performance of sensors over time (i.e., time dependency on
reliability) should be considered. In future research, the failure probabilities of these
components should be revised based on either experts’ opinions or further experimental
testing.
- The final fault tree was developed by combining the developed fault tree based on
vehicular component failures and the developed fault tree based on transportation
infrastructure components failure. It was assumed that these two fault trees were
independent. However, these fault trees could overlap depending on the nature of the
critical components’ failure. The interdependency of these two trees should be considered
in future studies.
- A traffic simulation model was calibrated using real-world data in this research, and it
was assumed that this calibration would be valid after deployment of autonomous
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vehicles. In the future, traffic models should be calibrated based on road-tested
autonomous vehicle trip information.
- In traffic simulation, travel demands and choice of modes were not considered;
however, with the deployment of autonomous vehicles, these values should be updated
and considered in traffic microsimulation.
- In the future, advanced simulators will be utilized to further analyze the safety
improvement of autonomous vehicles over human drivers. Two of the currently available
simulator packages are: CarSim (CarSim, 2017), and Webots (Webots, 2017). These
advance simulators could provide more accurate results than the results presented in this
research from the integration between traffic microsimulation and the SSAM
tool. United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)-registered, professional
autonomous vehicle simulation packages allow coding and analyses of model vehicle
dynamics as well as traffic crash scenarios, which does a better job of simulating realistic
behavior.
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Appendix A
Calculation of Simulation Runs Number

Table 13
Calculation based on network average speed for time interval 600-1500 seconds
Simulation Random Time Interval Average
Speed
Runs
Seed
(sec)
(mph)
1
5
600 – 1500
31.25272
2
10
600 – 1500
31.63295
3
15
600 – 1500
29.05456
4
20
600 – 1500
31.14431
5
25
600 – 1500
30.92869
6
30
600 – 1500
30.1724
7
35
600 – 1500
30.14788
8
40
600 – 1500
31.44893
9
45
600 – 1500
29.95752
10
50
600 – 1500
30.89594
Average
30.66359
Standard Deviation
0.806473
2
0.8065
𝑁 = (2 × 2.2622 ×
) = 1.42 𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑠
0.10 × 30.6636

Table 14
Calculation based on network average speed for time interval 1500-2400 seconds
Simulation
Runs
1
2
3
4
5

Random
Seed
5
10
15
20
25

Time Interval Average
Speed
(sec)
(mph)
1500 – 2400
27.46423
1500 – 2400
26.8748
1500 – 2400
25.69973
1500 – 2400
25.69288
1500 – 2400
25.37566
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Table 14 (continued)
Simulation
Runs
6
7
8
9
10

Random Time Interval Average
Speed
Seed
(sec)
(mph)
30
1500 – 2400
26.74075
35
1500 – 2400
25.29741
40
1500 – 2400
26.50471
45
1500 – 2400
26.59292
50
1500 – 2400
25.47071
Average
26.17138
Standard Deviation
0.754143
2
0.7541
𝑁 = (2 × 2.2622 ×
) = 1.70 𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑠
0.10 × 26.1714

Table 15
Calculation based on network average speed for time interval 2400-3300 seconds
Simulation Random Time Interval Average
Speed
Runs
Seed
(sec)
(mph)
1
5
2400 – 3300
24.44064
2
10
2400 – 3300
24.02435
3
15
2400 – 3300
23.40577
4
20
2400 – 3300
22.74352
5
25
2400 – 3300
22.16012
6
30
2400 – 3300
24.02695
7
35
2400 – 3300
22.17685
8
40
2400 – 3300
23.42267
9
45
2400 – 3300
23.97453
10
50
2400 – 3300
22.39201
Average
23.27674
Standard Deviation
0.851464
2
0.8515
𝑁 = (2 × 2.2622 ×
) = 2.74 𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑠
0.10 × 23.2767
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Table 16
Calculation based on network average speed for time interval 3300-4200 seconds
Simulation Random Time Interval Average
Speed
Runs
Seed
(sec)
(mph)
1
5
3300 – 4200
21.74673
2
10
3300 – 4200
22.10281
3
15
3300 – 4200
21.24155
4
20
3300 – 4200
20.48982
5
25
3300 – 4200
19.77108
6
30
3300 – 4200
21.91904
7
35
3300 – 4200
19.96118
8
40
3300 – 4200
21.25557
9
45
3300 – 4200
21.67305
10
50
3300 – 4200
20.07585
Average
21.02367
Standard Deviation
0.875165
2
0.8752
𝑁 = (2 × 2.2622 ×
) = 3.55 𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑠
0.10 × 21.0237

Table 17
Calculation based on average travel
measurement segment 1
Simulati Random Average
on Runs Seed
Travel Time
(sec) for time
interval 6001500 secs
1
5
289.32
2
10
304.57
3
15
316.32
4
20
295.44
5
25
322.43
6
30
337.17
7
35
311.58
8
40
293.79
9
45
323.42

time for different time interval for travel time
Average
Travel Time
(sec) for time
interval 15002400 secs
300.07
322.29
335.71
321.49
343.74
349.18
328.2
307.55
346.82
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Average
Travel Time
(sec) for time
interval 24003300 secs
304.58
319.85
333.11
328.47
355.64
343.59
334.11
314.11
334.58

Average
Travel Time
(sec) for time
interval 33004200 secs
333.91
351.96
360.21
342.9
387.65
386.76
367.88
331.61
391.14

Table 17 (continued)
Simulati
on Runs

10

Random
Seed

50
Average
SD
Number of
Simulation Runs

Average
Travel Time
(sec) for time
interval 6001500 secs
328.51
312.255
16.12081
5.46

Average
Travel Time
(sec) for time
interval 15002400 secs
354.56
330.961
18.26060
6.23
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Average
Travel Time
(sec) for time
interval 24003300 secs
368.89
333.693
19.06049
6.68

Average
Travel Time
(sec) for time
interval 33004200 secs
397.45
365.147
24.70667
9.37

Appendix B
External Driver Model Code (DLL File Development)
/* June. 2017 */
/* Autonomous Platooning for MS Thesis Work

*/

/* Modified by Plaban Das, Rowan University. */
#include "DriverModel.h"
/*==============================================================
============*/
/* These values are placeholders and declarations. */
/*======== Current Vehicle ======================*/
double time_step = 0.0;
long current_vehID = 0;
long current_lane = 0;
double current_lateral_pos = 0.0;
double current_speed = 0.0;
double current_accerleration = 0.0;
double current_length = 0.0;
double max_acceleration = 0.0;
long turning_indicator

= 0;

long current_category = 0;
double desired_velocity = 0.0;
double current_type = 0.0;
long vehicle_color = RGB(0,0,0);
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/*==========

Lead Vehicle ======================*/

long lead_vehID = 0;
double lead_vehicle_lateral_position = 0.0;
double lead_vehicle_distance

= 0.0;

double lead_vehicle_speed_difference = 0.0;
double lead_vehicle_acceleration = 0.0;
double lead_vehicle_length

= 0.0;

long lead_vehicle_category = 0;
/*========== Desired

======================*/

double desired_speed_limit = 0.0;
double desired_acceleration = 0.0;
double desired_lane_angle = 0.0;
long active_lane_change = 0;
long rel_target_lane

= 0;

/*==============================================================
============*/
BOOL APIENTRY DllMain (HANDLE hModule,
DWORD ul_reason_for_call,
LPVOID lpReserved)
{
switch (ul_reason_for_call) {
case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH:
case DLL_THREAD_ATTACH:

154

case DLL_THREAD_DETACH:
case DLL_PROCESS_DETACH:
break;
}
return TRUE;
}
/*==============================================================
============*/
DRIVERMODEL_API int DriverModelSetValue (long type,
long index1,
long index2,
long long_value,
double double_value,
char *string_value)
{
/* Sets the value of a data object of type <type>, selected by <index1> */
/* and possibly <index2>, to <long_value>, <double_value> or
/* <*string_value> (object and value selection depending on <type>).
/* Return value is 1 on success, otherwise 0.

*/

switch (type) {
case DRIVER_DATA_PATH

:

case DRIVER_DATA_TIMESTEP

:
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*/
*/

return 1;
case DRIVER_DATA_TIME

:

time_step = double_value;
return 1;
case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_ID

:

/* reset leading vehicle's data for this new vehicle */
current_vehID = long_value;
/* lead_vehicle_distance

= 999.0;

lead_vehicle_speed_difference = -99.0;
lead_vehicle_length

= 0.0; */

return 1;
case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_LANE

:

current_lane = long_value;
return 1;
case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_ODOMETER

:

case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_LANE_ANGLE

:

case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_LATERAL_POSITION :
current_lateral_pos = double_value;
return 1;
case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_VELOCITY
/* current vehicle velocity */
current_speed = double_value;
return 1;
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:

case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_ACCELERATION

:

/* vehicle's current acceleration */
current_accerleration = double_value;
return 1;
case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_LENGTH

:

/* vehicle's current length */
current_length = double_value;
return 1;
case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_WIDTH

:

case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_WEIGHT

:

case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_MAX_ACCELERATION :
/* vehicle's current maximum acceleration */
max_acceleration = double_value;
return 1;
case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_TURNING_INDICATOR :
turning_indicator = long_value;
return 1;
case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_CATEGORY

:

/* vehicle's category */
current_category = long_value;
return 1;
case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_PREFERRED_REL_LANE :
case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_USE_PREFERRED_LANE :
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return 1;
case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_DESIRED_VELOCITY :
/* vehicle's desired velocity */
desired_velocity = double_value;
return 1;
case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_X_COORDINATE

:

case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_Y_COORDINATE

:

case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_TYPE

:

/* vehicle's current type */
current_type = double_value;
return 1;
case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_COLOR

:

vehicle_color = long_value;
return 1;
case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_CURRENT_LINK

:

return 0; /* (To avoid getting sent lots of DRIVER_DATA_VEH_NEXT_LINKS
messages) */
/* Must return 1 if these messages are to be sent from VISSIM!
case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_NEXT_LINKS

:

case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_ACTIVE_LANE_CHANGE :
case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_REL_TARGET_LANE :
case DRIVER_DATA_NVEH_ID

:

/* lead vehicle's ID */
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*/

if (index1 == 0 && index2 == 1) {
lead_vehID = long_value;
}
return 1;
case DRIVER_DATA_NVEH_LANE_ANGLE

:

case DRIVER_DATA_NVEH_LATERAL_POSITION :
/* lead vehicle's lateral position */
if (index1 == 0 && index2 == 1){/* leading vehicle on the same lane as following
vehicle */
lead_vehicle_lateral_position = double_value;
}
return 1;
case DRIVER_DATA_NVEH_DISTANCE

:

/* lead vehicle's distance */
if (index1 == 0 && index2 == 1) { /* leading vehicle on own lane */
lead_vehicle_distance = double_value;
}
return 1;
case DRIVER_DATA_NVEH_REL_VELOCITY

:

if (index1 == 0 && index2 == 1) { /* leading vehicle on own lane */
lead_vehicle_speed_difference = double_value;
}
return 1;
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case DRIVER_DATA_NVEH_ACCELERATION

:

if (index1 == 0 && index2 == 1) { /* leading vehicle on own lane */
lead_vehicle_acceleration = double_value;
}
return 1;
case DRIVER_DATA_NVEH_LENGTH

:

if (index1 == 0 && index2 == 1) { /* leading vehicle on own lane */
lead_vehicle_length = double_value;
}
return 1;
case DRIVER_DATA_NVEH_WIDTH

:

return 1;
case DRIVER_DATA_NVEH_WEIGHT

:

case DRIVER_DATA_NVEH_TURNING_INDICATOR :
case DRIVER_DATA_NVEH_CATEGORY

:

if (index1 == 0 && index2 == 1) { /* leading vehicle on own lane */
lead_vehicle_category = long_value;
}
return 1;
case DRIVER_DATA_NVEH_LANE_CHANGE
case DRIVER_DATA_NO_OF_LANES

:

case DRIVER_DATA_LANE_WIDTH

:

case DRIVER_DATA_LANE_END_DISTANCE
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:

:

case DRIVER_DATA_RADIUS

:

case DRIVER_DATA_MIN_RADIUS

:

case DRIVER_DATA_DIST_TO_MIN_RADIUS
case DRIVER_DATA_SLOPE

:

:

case DRIVER_DATA_SLOPE_AHEAD

:

case DRIVER_DATA_SIGNAL_DISTANCE
case DRIVER_DATA_SIGNAL_STATE

:
:

case DRIVER_DATA_SIGNAL_STATE_START

:

case DRIVER_DATA_SPEED_LIMIT_DISTANCE :
case DRIVER_DATA_SPEED_LIMIT_VALUE

:

desired_speed_limit = double_value;
return 1;
case DRIVER_DATA_DESIRED_ACCELERATION :
desired_acceleration = double_value;
return 1;
case DRIVER_DATA_DESIRED_LANE_ANGLE :
desired_lane_angle = double_value;
return 1;
case DRIVER_DATA_ACTIVE_LANE_CHANGE :
active_lane_change = long_value;
return 1;
case DRIVER_DATA_REL_TARGET_LANE :
rel_target_lane = long_value;
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return 1;
default :
return 0;
}
}
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
DRIVERMODEL_API int DriverModelGetValue (long type,
long index1,
long index2,
long *long_value,
double *double_value,
char **string_value)
{
/* Gets the value of a data object of type <type>, selected by <index1> */
/* and possibly <index2>, and writes that value to <*double_value>,
/* <*float_value> or <**string_value> (object and value selection
/* depending on <type>).

*/

/* Return value is 1 on success, otherwise 0.
switch (type) {
case DRIVER_DATA_STATUS :
*long_value = 0;
return 1;
case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_TURNING_INDICATOR :
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*/

*/
*/

*long_value = turning_indicator;
return 1;
case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_DESIRED_VELOCITY :
*double_value = desired_velocity;
return 1;
case DRIVER_DATA_VEH_COLOR :
*long_value = vehicle_color;
return 1;
case DRIVER_DATA_WANTS_SUGGESTION :
*long_value = 1;
return 1;
case DRIVER_DATA_DESIRED_ACCELERATION : {

/* START

ACCELERATION FUNCTION */
double net_distance

= lead_vehicle_distance - lead_vehicle_length;

/* Net

distance */
double lead_vehicle_speed = current_speed - lead_vehicle_speed_difference;

/*

Lead vehicle speed */
double desired_distance = 2; /* this is in meter. times 1 s = 2.0*/
/* Changing this value will change the distance from the lead vehicle where the
autonomous car will emergency brake. Make sure this is less than desired_distance. */
double emergency_stop_distance = 1;
long regular_cat = current_category;
long lead_cat = lead_vehicle_category;
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if (regular_cat == lead_cat) {
if (lead_vehicle_speed_difference > 0){
/* Faster than the leading vehicle */
if (lead_vehicle_speed > 0) {
/* Not behind standstill vehicle (lead_vehicle_speed > 0)*/
if (net_distance > desired_distance) {
/* slow down to leading vehicle's speed with 1 s time gap */
desired_acceleration = - lead_vehicle_speed_difference
* lead_vehicle_speed_difference
/ (net_distance - desired_distance)
/ 2.0;
}
else {
/* try to increase distance */
desired_acceleration = - lead_vehicle_speed_difference - 1.0;
if (net_distance < emergency_stop_distance) {
desired_acceleration = - lead_vehicle_speed_difference
* lead_vehicle_speed_difference
/ (emergency_stop_distance - net_distance)
/ 2.0;

/* emergency braking */

}
}
}
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else {
/* leading vehicle is standing still (lead_vehicle_speed = 0)*/
if (net_distance < emergency_stop_distance) {
desired_acceleration = - lead_vehicle_speed_difference
* lead_vehicle_speed_difference
/ (emergency_stop_distance - net_distance)
/ 2.0;

/* emergency braking */

}
else {
/* brake to standstill in 1.0 m distance */
desired_acceleration = - lead_vehicle_speed_difference
* lead_vehicle_speed_difference
/ (net_distance - emergency_stop_distance)
/ 2.0;
}
}
}
/* --------if (lead_vehicle_speed_difference <= 0)---------- */
/* Slower than the leading vehicle */
else {
/* accelerate to min of leading vehicle's speed and own desired speed */
/* vehicle is far from leading vehicle: try to decrease distance */
if (net_distance > desired_distance) {
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desired_acceleration = lead_vehicle_speed_difference
* lead_vehicle_speed_difference
/ (net_distance - desired_distance)
/ 2.0;
}
else {
/* vehicle is within desired distance of leading vehicle: try to decrease distance
*/
desired_acceleration = lead_vehicle_speed_difference + 1.0;
/* vehicle is very close to leading vehicle: try to increase distance */
if (net_distance < emergency_stop_distance) {
desired_acceleration = - lead_vehicle_speed_difference
* lead_vehicle_speed_difference
/ (emergency_stop_distance - net_distance)
/ 2.0;

/* emergency braking */

}
}
}
*double_value = desired_acceleration;
}
else {
*double_value = desired_acceleration;
}
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return 1;
}
case DRIVER_DATA_DESIRED_LANE_ANGLE :
*double_value = desired_lane_angle;
return 1;
case DRIVER_DATA_ACTIVE_LANE_CHANGE :
*long_value = active_lane_change;
return 1;
case DRIVER_DATA_REL_TARGET_LANE :
*long_value = rel_target_lane;
return 1;
case DRIVER_DATA_SIMPLE_LANECHANGE :
*long_value = 1;
return 1;
default :
return 0;
}
}
/*==============================================================
============*/
DRIVERMODEL_API int DriverModelExecuteCommand (long number)
{
/* Executes the command <number> if that is available in the driver */
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/* module. Return value is 1 on success, otherwise 0.
switch (number) {
case DRIVER_COMMAND_INIT :
return 1;
case DRIVER_COMMAND_CREATE_DRIVER :
return 1;
case DRIVER_COMMAND_KILL_DRIVER :
return 1;
case DRIVER_COMMAND_MOVE_DRIVER :
return 1;
default :
return 0;
}
}
resource.rc file
#define IDS_STRING1

1

#define IDS_STRING2

2

#define IDS_STRING3

3

STRINGTABLE
{
IDS_STRING1 "DriverModelSetValue"
IDS_STRING2 "DriverModelGetValue"
IDS_STRING3 "DriverModelExecuteCommand"
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*/

}
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Appendix C
Code for Integration of Fault Tree and Simulation Modeling
'Programmer: Plaban Das, MS Thesis Work
'Last Update: 7-12-2017
Imports VISSIMLIB
Module Module1
Sub Main()
' Declaration of Variables
Dim Vissim As Object
Dim veh As VISSIMLIB.IVehicle
Dim simend As Integer
Dim vehNo As Integer
' Distance measured in Vissim in meters
Dim total_dis As Double = 0
Dim over_single_sec As Double = 0
Dim j As Integer = 0 : Dim aa As Integer = 0 : Dim bb As Integer = 1 ' : Dim ad As
Integer = 0
Dim total_distance_traveled(1, j) As Double : Dim multiplier As Integer = 100 :
Dim crash_start As Integer = 0
'Dim comp As Integer = 2

' Results from fault tree and convert miles value to meters
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Dim mile_per_inci As Double = (1000000 / 158) ' Its original value is = 1000000/
158 = 6330
Dim conversion_factor As Double = 1609.34 ' Conversion factor from mile to
meter, as values in vissim are in meters
Dim response_time As Double = 180 ' Its original value is = 3 mins = 180 sec
Dim pre_value As Double
Dim bool As Boolean = False
Dim random_veh As Integer
Dim target_veh As Integer
'Load Vissim file with 32 bit version
Vissim = CreateObject("Vissim.Vissim-32.700")
'Load Vissim File from Drive Desired Location
Vissim.Loadnet("C:\Users\dasp6\Downloads\Research_Autonomous
2015_Thesis\Autonomous

VISSIM\VISSIM

Models\Vissim

network.inpx")
simend = Vissim.Simulation.AttValue("SimPeriod")
MsgBox(simend)

For i = 1 To simend
'Run simulation single step
Vissim.Simulation.RunSingleStep
For Each veh In Vissim.Net.Vehicles
'Search all vehicle
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Car_Summer

Model_I476\i476

If veh.AttValue("VehType") = 500 Then
'Look for autonomous vehicle, they have vehicle type = 400
vehNo = veh.AttValue("NO")
total_dis = veh.AttValue("DistTravTotal")
If aa < bb Then
total_distance_traveled(0, j) = vehNo
total_distance_traveled(1, j) = total_dis
aa = 2
End If

For jj = 0 To ((total_distance_traveled.Length / 2) - 1)
If total_distance_traveled(0, jj) = vehNo Then
total_distance_traveled(1, jj) = total_dis
Exit For
ElseIf (total_distance_traveled(0, jj) <> vehNo) Then
If (jj < ((total_distance_traveled.Length / 2) - 1)) Then
GoTo Line1
ElseIf (jj = ((total_distance_traveled.Length / 2) - 1)) Then
j=j+1
ReDim Preserve total_distance_traveled(1, j)
total_distance_traveled(0, j) = vehNo
total_distance_traveled(1, j) = total_dis
End If
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End If
Line1:

Next

bool = True
End If
Next

If bool = True Then
over_single_sec = 0
For ii = 0 To ((total_distance_traveled.Length / 2) - 1)
over_single_sec = over_single_sec + total_distance_traveled(1, ii)
Next
End If
'Here is for the crash conditions
If over_single_sec > (multiplier * mile_per_inci * conversion_factor) Then
'Now total distance is higher than the crash distance
'Cond==================================================
Dim all_veh_count(0) As Integer
Dim pp As Integer = 0
For Each veh In Vissim.Net.Vehicles
If veh.AttValue("VehType") = 500 Then
If pp = 0 Then
all_veh_count(pp) = veh.AttValue("NO")
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GoTo Line2
End If
ReDim Preserve all_veh_count(pp)
all_veh_count(pp) = veh.AttValue("NO")
Line2:

pp = pp + 1
End If
Next
'Select a vehicle randomly to cause a crash
random_veh = CInt(Int(((all_veh_count.Length) * Rnd()) + 0))
If random_veh = all_veh_count.Length Then
random_veh = random_veh - 1
End If
target_veh = all_veh_count(random_veh)
place_holder = all_veh_count
'Show the vehicle no to visualize
MsgBox("Crashed Vehicle No:" & target_veh)
multiplier = multiplier + 1
crash_start = i
End If
'Stop the vehicle till response team appear at the crash scene
If (crash_start <> 0) And (i <= (crash_start + response_time)) Then
If (crash_start = i) Then
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pre_value

=

Vissim.Net.Vehicles.ItemByKey(target_veh).AttValue("DesSpeed")
End If
Vissim.Net.Vehicles.ItemByKey(target_veh).AttValue("DesSpeed") = 0
Vissim.Net.Vehicles.ItemByKey(target_veh).AttValue("Speed") = 0
ElseIf (crash_start <> 0) And (i = (crash_start + response_time + 1)) Then
'Response team appeared
Vissim.Net.Vehicles.ItemByKey(target_veh).AttValue("DesSpeed")

=

pre_value
Vissim.Net.Vehicles.RemoveVehicle(target_veh)
End If
Next
MsgBox("End")
Vissim = Nothing
End Sub
End

Module
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Appendix D
Survey Calculation

Table 18
Responses of the question asking failure probability of LIDAR
PartiSet of Options (failure probability ranges) in the question
cipants A: < 1.00
B: 1.01 to
C: 3.01 to
D: 6.01 to
E: > 10.00
3.00
6.00
10.00
1
0
0
5
0
0
2
0
0
5
0
0
3
0
0
5
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
5
5
0
0
0
0
5

Number of experts, m = 5
Number of options, n = 5
Now, 𝑅 = ∑𝑛𝑖= 1(𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅̅ )2 = 200, where for each option, 𝑅𝑖 is the sum of the rating
̅
participants j provides to a specific option: 𝑅𝑖 = ∑𝑚
𝑗=1 𝑟𝑖𝑗 and 𝑅 is the mean of the 𝑅𝑖 .
12 ×𝑅

Kendall’s W = 𝑚2 ×(𝑛3 − 𝑛) = 0.8

Table 19
Responses of the question asking failure probability of camera
Participants
1
2
3
4
5

Set of Options (failure probability ranges) in the question
A: <
B:1.01 to
C: 3.01 to
D: 6.01 to
E: >
1.00
3.00
6.00
10.00
10.00
0
5
0
0
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
0
5
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As we mentioned before, m = 5, and n = 5,
Now, 𝑅 = ∑𝑛𝑖= 1(𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅̅ )2 = 50
12 ×𝑅

Kendall’s W = 𝑚2 ×(𝑛3 − 𝑛) = 0.2
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Appendix E
Travel Time Data for Travel Time Measurement Segment 1

Table 20
Travel time data for travel time measurement segment 1
Random
Seed #

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Time
Intervals
600-1500
1500-2400
2400-3300
3300-4200
600-1500
1500-2400
2400-3300
3300-4200
600-1500
1500-2400
2400-3300
3300-4200
600-1500
1500-2400
2400-3300
3300-4200
600-1500
1500-2400
2400-3300
3300-4200
600-1500
1500-2400
2400-3300
3300-4200
600-1500
1500-2400
2400-3300
3300-4200

AV 0%
289.32
300.07
304.58
333.91
304.57
322.29
319.85
351.96
316.30
335.71
333.11
360.21
295.44
321.49
328.47
342.90
322.43
343.74
355.64
387.65
337.17
349.18
343.59
386.76
311.58
328.20
334.11
367.88

Travel Time (in seconds)
AV 10% AV 25% AV 50%
266.65
237.11
209.74
282.26
259.10
222.87
271.18
244.13
218.49
307.62
266.10
242.97
283.41
255.42
230.15
299.28
294.55
249.50
287.13
267.97
243.23
329.81
316.54
271.81
279.88
253.16
194.40
303.78
295.28
231.00
287.08
257.53
226.92
334.32
319.28
240.06
283.38
268.69
227.83
311.38
291.27
251.30
299.26
270.88
236.88
333.66
308.23
266.95
292.65
262.04
232.97
312.69
304.28
254.04
295.14
298.27
249.88
344.59
315.59
277.64
296.44
229.94
194.06
307.72
244.90
204.38
297.06
232.36
208.50
331.37
274.92
237.34
276.66
256.72
223.36
303.24
291.65
265.91
288.00
277.25
231.32
318.80
309.53
269.46
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AV 90%
157.92
164.54
153.88
179.89
158.45
177.33
171.97
195.19
139.46
166.20
153.18
177.23
145.82
160.32
151.47
194.63
126.91
164.57
147.67
192.37
163.42
182.59
171.23
191.15
123.92
164.36
141.48
183.11

Table 20 (continued)
Random
Seed #

40

45

50

55

Average

Time
Intervals
600-1500
1500-2400
2400-3300
3300-4200
600-1500
1500-2400
2400-3300
3300-4200
600-1500
1500-2400
2400-3300
3300-4200
600-1500
1500-2400
2400-3300
3300-4200
600-1500
1500-2400
2400-3300
3300-4200

AV 0%
293.80
307.55
314.11
331.61
323.42
346.82
334.58
391.14
328.50
354.56
368.89
397.45
296.95
321.51
319.67
347.95
310.9
330.1
332.4
363.6

Travel Time (in seconds)
AV 10% AV 25% AV 50%
287.84
268.59
234.22
311.62
292.64
264.60
298.85
271.67
255.23
336.49
317.71
268.70
285.01
265.29
235.34
292.69
304.80
257.62
290.45
295.39
267.06
313.02
326.77
268.77
296.95
262.71
226.23
304.14
298.85
248.91
288.94
263.83
249.60
349.28
306.85
261.70
277.67
230.40
198.18
297.83
264.25
239.20
282.62
239.85
231.53
321.27
271.24
243.94
284.2
253.6
218.8
302.4
285.6
244.5
289.6
265.4
238.1
329.1
303.0
259.0
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AV 90%
146.37
165.73
162.30
185.92
166.89
183.85
172.48
195.85
135.08
143.72
137.09
150.56
159.90
175.99
147.96
197.84
147.6
168.1
155.5
185.8

Appendix F
Conflict Analysis for Different Autonomous Vehicle Penetrations

Table 21
Conflict analysis for different autonomous vehicle penetrations (TTC= 1.5 and PET =
4.0)
AV
Random
Percentages Seed #

Crossing
Conflicts

AV 0%

6
9
20
24
11
34
27
3
13
7
22
176
8
10
5
6
11
7
5
10
7
12
8
89

Total
AV 10%

Total

5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55

Lane
Change
Conflicts
130180
129848
143679
143567
153577
133322
152268
132972
137473
149728
140111
1546725
110036
113734
117349
127766
121691
120493
127636
112945
115630
134583
122351
1324214
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Rear End
Conflicts
Sub-total
2868
3056
2949
3066
3138
3091
3269
2943
3080
3188
2900
33548
2873
2927
2951
2993
3042
3207
3239
2990
3104
3327
3052
33705

133054
132913
146648
146657
156726
136447
155564
135918
140566
152923
143033
1580449
112917
116671
120305
130765
124744
123707
130880
115945
118741
137922
125411
1358008

Table 21 (continued)
AV
Random
Percentages Seed #

Crossing
Conflicts

AV 25%

5
2
4
3
1
3
3
6
3
7
2
39
5
1
0
3
5
3
1
1
0
1
3
23
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
2
7

Total
AV 50%

Total
AV 90%

Total

5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55

Lane
Change
Conflicts
73083
80067
70037
85475
81518
78988
79628
81256
74018
92025
75647
871742
45968
47984
45807
50316
45602
48442
48783
48079
44270
50066
46927
522244
36906
38017
36233
39108
35920
38395
37105
37622
36290
38655
36270
410521
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Rear End
Conflicts
Sub-total
1812
1974
1779
1819
1907
1862
1985
2046
1927
1996
1815
20922
852
933
776
997
881
937
901
846
771
968
859
9721
277
281
296
301
230
321
325
276
256
273
272
3108

74900
82043
71820
87297
83426
80853
81616
83308
75948
94028
77464
892703
46825
48918
46583
51316
46488
49382
49685
48926
45041
51035
47789
531988
37184
38298
36529
39410
36150
38717
37430
37898
36547
38929
36544
413636

